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Abstract
We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream firms (man-
ufacturers) that produce differentiated goods and downstream firms (retailers) that compete
imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information
to the contracting parties. We show that both exclusive dealing and vertical integration be-
tween a manufacturer and a retailer lead to vertical foreclosure, to the detriment of consumers
and society. Finally, we show that firms have indeed an incentive to sign such contracts or
to integrate vertically.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study interlocking relationships in vertically related oligopolies, where the
same competing upstream firms deal with the same competing downstream firms. We develop
a framework that allows for general contracts between upstream and downstream firms, the
terms of which are private information to the contracting parties. In this framework, firms have
an incentive to sign exclusive dealing provisions or, alternatively, to integrate vertically, at the
expense of consumers and society. The contribution of this paper is thus two-fold: It provides a
general and yet tractable framework for the analysis of interlocking relationships; and it sheds
light on the long-standing policy debate on vertical foreclosure.
Interlocking relationships. Interlocking relationships are endemic in both consumer goods
and intermediate goods industries. For example, most supermarkets carry both Coca Cola and
Pepsi Cola, and competing aircraft manufacturers procure components (e.g., avionics, wheels
and brakes) from the same competing suppliers (such as Honeywell and Thales). Yet, despite
the prevalence of such interlocking relationships, so far the IO literature on vertically related
markets has mostly focused on upstream (or downstream) monopoly, or on “competing vertical
structures” where each upstream firm deals with a distinct set of downstream firms (e.g., fran-
chise networks).1 The few papers that do allow for such interlocking vertical relationships have
two types of limitations: they often restrict attention to particular types of (public) contracts
such as linear tariffs or two-part tariffs (see, e.g., Dobson and Waterson (2007), Rey and Vergé
(2010), and Allain and Chambolle, 2011), or they assume that the upstream firms produce a
homogeneous good (see, e.g., de Fontenay and Gans (2005) and Nocke and White (2007,2010)).
Moreover, most papers assume that contracts are publicly observable, giving rise to strategic
commitment effects which may not seem very plausible.2
By contrast, we propose a framework, based on secret contracting, which allows for general
(menus of) non-linear tariffs and imperfect competition both upstream (product differentiation)
and downstream (Cournot competition). We show that the framework is tractable by charac-
terizing the complete set of equilibrium outcomes in a range of situations, in the absence or
presence of (single or pairwise) exclusive dealing or vertical integration.
Vertical foreclosure. Whether firms can engage in exclusive dealing or merge vertically for
1Papers featuring competing vertical structures include Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Rey and Stiglitz (1988,
1995), Gal-Or (1991), Jullien and Rey (2007), and Piccolo and Miklos-Thal (2012).
2Models of interlocking relationships with observable contracts may also run into equilibrium existence prob-
lems; see, e.g., Rey and Vergé (2010) and Schutz (2013).
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purely anti-competitive purposes has been the object of a long-standing debate in policy circles
as well as in the academic literature.3 The so-called Chicago critique pointed out that the
“monopoly leverage” concept originally used was based on a confusion, as there is only one source
of profit in a vertically related industry. In response to this critique, Ordover, Saloner and Salop
(1990)4 showed that an integrated firm may stop supplying downstream rivals, in order to confer
market power to the other suppliers and raise in this way downstream rivals’ costs. As pointed out
by Hart and Tirole (1990) and Reiffen (1992), however, this analysis relied on the assumptions
that (i) an integrated supplier could somehow pre-commit itself not to supply downstream rivals
(as ex post it would have an incentive to supply the rival), and (ii) contracting with the other
suppliers is inefficient (linear tariffs, giving rise to double marginalization). Hart and Tirole
(1990), O’Brien and Shaffer (1992), and McAfee and Schwartz (1994) emphasize instead that,
under secret contracting, exclusive dealing or vertical integration can help a dominant supplier
exert its market power. While these papers is not subject to the same limitations as Ordover,
Salop and Saloner (1990), they restrict attention to upstream monopoly or quasi-monopoly
settings, which has severely limited their impact on actual policy decisions. We contribute to
this debate by showing that in interlocking relationships as well, firms can have incentives to
engage in vertical foreclosure in order to exert market power at the expense of consumers and
society.
This paper. We consider a successive duopoly framework. For the sake of exposition, we
will refer to the upstream firms as manufacturers and to the downstream firms as retailers; it
should however be clear that the analysis can be transposed to other types of vertically related
industries. Manufacturers produce differentiated goods, and retailers can choose which of the
goods (if any) to stock and sell on to consumers. While we introduce mild regulatory conditions
on demand, we do not impose any restriction on tariffs; finally, we assume that manufacturers’
offers as well as retailers’ acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties,
thereby discarding strategic effects.
We first provide a complete characterization of equilibria in the absence of any exclusive
dealing or vertical integration. While there exists a range of equilibria, they all yield the same
retail prices and quantities, and only differ in the type of contracts being signed and on how
manufacturers and retailers share profits. Manufacturers prefer the equilibrium outcome induced
by two-part tariffs, which is also the unique equilibrium outcome when below-cost pricing is ruled
3For reviews of this debate, see, e.g., Rey and Tirole (2007) and Whinston (2006).
4See also Salinger (1992).
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out.
We then analyze the impact of exclusive dealing and vertical integration. Under single ex-
clusive dealing, there is again a range of equilibria, which here only differ in how manufacturers
share profits with the common retailer. Under pairwise exclusive dealing, the division of profit
is also uniquely determined. Under single vertical integration, there exists an equilibrium that
leads to the complete foreclosure of the independent downstream rival, and thus yields the same
retail prices and quantities as under (single) exclusive dealing. Under pairwise vertical integra-
tion the unique equilibrium outcome is identical to that under pairwise exclusive dealing, as
each vertically integrated firm chooses to foreclose its rival.
Finally, we show that firms have indeed an incentive to engage in exclusive dealing or to
integrate vertically, to the detriment of consumers and society.
Roadmap. Section 2 describes our framework. Section 3 provides a complete characterization
of equilibria in the absence of any exclusive dealing or vertical integration. Sections 4 and 5
respectively study exclusive dealing and vertical integration. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Framework
We consider a vertically related industry with two symmetrically differentiated manufacturers,
 and . Manufacturer ,  ∈ {}, produces good  at constant unit cost   0. The
manufacturers distribute their goods through two perfectly substitutable retailers, 1 and 2,
each of whom faces the same constant unit cost . For notational simplicity, we henceforth set
 ≡ 0.
For expositional simplicity consumer demand is assumed to be symmetric: The inverse
demand for good  =  is given by  ( ),  6=  ∈ {}, where  ≡ 1 + 2 denotes
total consumption of good , and  ≥ 0 the quantity of good  purchased from retailer ,
 ∈ {1 2}.5 Throughout the paper, we further impose the following conditions:
(A.1)  (0 0)   and, for  sufficiently large,  ( 0)   and  (0 )  .
(A.2) For any ( ) ≥ 0,6
1 ( ) ≤ 2 ( ) ≤ 0
5Demand symmetry implies 2 (0) = 2 (0 ) (= 12 (0), where  (· ·) denotes consumers’ gross
surplus), and thus 212 (0) = 222 (0 ), for all  and 0.
6Throughout the paper,  denotes the partial derivative of the function  with respect to its th argument;
likewise, 2 will denote the second-order partial derivative with respect to the th and th arguments.
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with strict inequalities when  ( )  0.
Condition (A.1) is essentially a viability assumption, whereas condition (A.2) simply asserts
that goods  and  are (imperfect) substitutes.7
We confine attention to vertical contracts; that is, we do not allow for any kind of “horizontal”
agreements such as, e.g., market-share contracts, and consider instead contracts purely based
on the quantity traded: Formally, a contract between and  is a tariff   : <+ → <, where
 () is the payment from  to  in return for a quantity  of good .8 We do not impose
any further restriction, however, and thus allow for any nonlinear tariff; special cases of interest
are:
• Two-part tariff:  () =  +, where  is the fixed (or “franchise”) fee, and  ≥ 0 the
marginal wholesale price; we will denote such a two-part tariff by ( ).
• Forcing contract:
 () =
⎧
⎨
⎩
ˆ if  = ˆ
∞ otherwise,
where ˆ is the “forced” quantity; we will denote such a forcing contract by (ˆ ˆ ).
The contracting terms between  and  are private information to the two parties. The
timing is as follows:
Stage 1 Manufacturers simultaneously offer (secret) contracts to retailers.
Stage 2 Retailers simultaneously (and secretly): (i) accept or reject the offers; and (ii) for each
accepted contract, choose how much to put on the final market.9 The resulting prices are
such that markets clear.
We will also consider variants involving exclusive dealing and vertical integration. An ex-
clusive dealing provision restricts the set of partners to whom offers can be made (in case of
exclusive distribution), or from whom they can be accepted (in case of single branding). When
7The condition on  ( 0) follows from the others but is mentioned explicitly for the sake of exposition.
8For the sake of exposition, we will assume that parties contract on the quantity  sold to consumers, rather
than the quantity bought from the manfacturer. The distinction becomes moot when the production cost is large
enough, as then a retailer will not want to buy more than it needs in any relevant scenario.
9As acceptance and output decisions are simultaneous, there is no role here for menus of contracts: Offering a
menu of tariffs is de facto equivalent to offering the lower envelope of these tariffs.
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instead  and  are vertically integrated, they are assumed to maximize their joint profits,
regardless of internal transfer prices.  and  moreover “share information” in the sense
that, when making its acceptance and output decisions,  is informed about the offer that its
upstream affiliate  has previously made to the rival retailer . By contrast, as acceptance
and output decisions are made simultaneously, when making its output decisions  cannot be
informed of whether the rival  accepted ’s offer.10
We will study Perfect Bayesian Equilibria with passive beliefs, in which retailers do not revise
their beliefs about the offer made to the other retailer when receiving an out-of-equilibrium offer.
As retailers compete downstream in quantities, these passive beliefs coincide with the “wary
beliefs” introduced by McAfee and Schwartz (1994), as the contract signed with a retailer has
no impact on a manufacturer’s gains from trade with the other retailer.
3 Baseline Model
In this section, we characterize the equilibria of our baseline model. We first define the notion
of a “cost-based” contract, in which the marginal input price coincides with the marginal cost
of production, and show that unintegrated manufacturers sign cost-based contracts with every
available retailer. Drawing on this insight, we then characterize the equilibria in the absence of
exclusive dealing and vertical integration.
3.1 Independent Manufacturers
Throughout the analysis, we will use indices  6=  when referring to and, and  6=  when
referring to 1 and 2. Let
 (  ) ≡ argmax [ (1 + 2 1 + 2)− ]  +  (1 + 2 1 + 2) 
denote the set of bilaterally efficient values for the output , from the standpoint of the pair
 −, holding fixed all other outputs.11 We will say that the equilibrium contract signed by
 and  is “cost-based” if it induces a bilaterally efficient output, given the other equilibrium
outputs:
10This avoids having to take a stand on how the integrated retailer would interpret an unexpected acceptance
or rejection of the upstream affiliate’s offer.
11Note that this set does not depend on the tariffs   and .
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Definition 1 The equilibrium contract  (·) between  and  is said to be cost-based if,
when accepted, and given the outputs of the other channels (  ),  (·) induces a quantity
 ∈  (  ).
The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium contracts signed by unintegrated manu-
facturers:
Lemma 1 Suppose  is not vertically integrated (whereas  may or may not be vertically
integrated). Then, in any equilibrium  signs a cost-based contract with every retailer  that
is available, given the exclusive dealing provisions (with the convention that they sign a “null”
contract if it is bilaterally efficient not to trade).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition is simple: Under passive beliefs, each  expects its rival  to stick to the
equilibrium quantities even when receiving a deviant offer from an independent . Moreover,
such a deviant offer does not affect the profit that  makes on its contract with . In
equilibrium, the contract between  and  must therefore maximize the joint bilateral profit
of the contracting parties, assuming that  sticks to its equilibrium quantities, which is achieved
by signing a cost-based contract.
3.2 Non-Exclusive Relationships and Vertical Separation
We now characterize the set of equilibria in the absence of exclusive dealing and vertical inte-
gration (which we will index by the superscript “◦”). From Lemma 1, we know that each 
must sign a cost-based contract with each , implying the following result:
Proposition 1 In the absence of exclusive dealing and vertical integration, the set of equilibrium
quantities (◦1 ◦2 ◦1 ◦2) coincides with that of a Cournot multiproduct duopoly in which the
two firms (1 and 2) can produce the same two goods ( and ) at marginal cost .
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 1.
For the sake of exposition, it is useful to pin down the equilibrium outcome; the following
mild regularity conditions ensure that the equilibrium retail prices and quantities are uniquely
defined and symmetric:
(A.3) For any ( ) ≥ 0 such that  ( )  0, we have
21 ( ) + 211 ( )  2 ( ) + 212 ( )  0
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(A.4) For any ( ) ≥ 0 such that  ()  0, and for any  ∈ [0 ] and any  ∈ [0  ],
we have
21 ( ) + 211 ( )  + 222 (  ) 
 2 ( ) + 2 (  ) + 212 ( )  + 212 (  ) 
 0
Condition (A.3) ensures that a Cournot duopoly game, in which one firm sells good  and
the other good , would have a unique, stable equilibrium. Condition (A.4) further ensures that
profits remain concave when both firms can sell goods  and . In the case of linear demand,
(A.3) and (A.4) boil down to 1  2  0, and are thus implied by (A.2).
We have:
Proposition 2 In the absence of exclusive dealing and vertical integration, under Assumptions
(A.3)-(A.4) the equilibrium quantities must satisfy ◦ = ◦, for  ∈ {} and  ∈ {1 2},
where ◦ is the unique solution to:
 (2◦ 2◦)− + [1 (2◦ 2◦) + 2 (2◦ 2◦)] ◦ = 0
Proof. See Appendix B.
Hence, any equilibrium must be bilaterally efficient, which under the regularity assumptions
(A.3)-(A.4) implies that each “channel” must sell the same quantity ◦. It follows that all
equilibria generate the same industry-wide aggregate profit,
Π◦ ≡ [ (2◦ 2◦)− ] 4◦
’s profit is therefore of the form ◦ = ◦1 + ◦2, where ◦ = ◦(◦)− ◦ is ’s profit on
its contract with , whereas ’s profit is ◦ = 2 (2◦ 2◦) ◦ − ◦(◦)− ◦(◦).
To support such an equilibrium, contracts must be somewhat flexible: As shown in Appen-
dix D, there is no equilibrium in which a manufacturer offers a single forcing contract. The
intuition is as follows. In equilibrium, each retailer must be indifferent between accepting both
manufacturers’ offers, and only one (either one): If a retailer strictly preferred dealing with both
manufacturers than with only one of them, then the rival manufacturer could profitably deviate
by asking for a larger share of the profits. But if, say,  offers  a single forcing contract
(◦  ◦), then is also indifferent between whether or not  also accepts upstream rival ’s
offer; hence, the joint profit of  and  must be the same as what they would obtain if 
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were to deal exclusively with . But in equilibrium, the sum of ’s profit and of ’s profit
from its contract with  is given by
◦ + ◦ = [◦ (◦)− ◦] +
£
2 (2◦ 2◦)− ◦ (◦)− ◦ (◦)
¤
= [◦ (◦)− ◦] + [ (2◦ ◦)− ◦ (◦)]
= [ (2◦ ◦)− ] ◦
Hence, under exclusivity  and  could generate more profit by replacing ◦ with
ˆ ≡ argmax {[ (
◦ +  ◦)− ] } 
and share the profit increase through an appropriate transfer ˆ ; it follows that  could prof-
itably deviate by offering the forcing contract
³
ˆ ˆ
´
, thereby inducing  to “bump” the rival
manufacturer (note that this deviation does not affect the profit that  obtains from dealing
with the other retailer, ).
We now show that simple two-part tariffs suffice to support an equilibrium:
Proposition 3 In the absence of exclusive dealing and vertical integration, under Assumptions
(A.3)-(A.4) there exists an equilibrium in which each manufacturer signs with each retailer the
cost-based two-part tariff (◦  ◦) = (∆◦), where
∆◦ ≡ [ (2◦ 2◦)− ] 2◦ −max {[ (
◦ +  ◦)− ] }
denotes each manufacturer’s contribution to the profit generated by a retailer.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition is as follows. First, cost-based two-part tariffs allow retailers to buy any mar-
ginal quantity at cost. It follows that: (i) as a manufacturer does not care about the level of trade
chosen by retailers, it is indifferent as to whether retailers will deal with the rival manufacturer
or not; and (ii) in both instances, the tariff is bilaterally efficient, whether or not the retailer
deals with the other manufacturer. Second, the equilibrium fixed fees are such that each retailer
is indifferent between dealing with both manufacturers, or with either one on an exclusivity
basis. It follows that these tariffs eliminate the above “bumping” problem, as a manufacturer
would have to give away some of its profit in order to convince a retailer to opt for exclusivity.
There exist many other equilibria, however; although all equilibria must rely on cost-based
contracts, and thus generate the same industry profit, Π◦, they can differ in the way firms share
this profit:
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Proposition 4 In the absence of exclusive dealing and vertical integration, under Assumptions
(A.3)-(A.4):
• Manufacturers’ equilibrium profits are of the form
³
◦ = ◦1 + ◦2 ◦ = ◦1 + ◦2
´
,
where ◦ ∈ [0∆◦].
• Any profile of profits in this range can be supported by an equilibrium in which each 
offers each  a pair of forcing contracts; however, outcomes giving less than its contri-
bution to a manufacturer (i.e., such that ◦  2∆◦ for some ) can only be supported by
tariffs that price some incremental quantity below cost.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 4 shows that, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to equilibria
in which each offers each  a menu of two forcing contracts: A cost-based contract (◦  ◦)
“designed” for common agency, which  accepts along the equilibrium path, and a contract³
˜◦ ˜ ◦
´
“designed” for exclusivity, where ˜◦  ◦ and  (˜◦ − ◦) ≥ ˜ ◦ −  ◦  0. In
equilibrium, each retailer is indifferent between picking both (◦  ◦) and (◦  ◦), or picking
only
³
˜◦ ˜ ◦
´
, from either manufacturer  = .
Finally, the division of profit varies substantially across equilibria. The intuition is as follows.
Even though they are not accepted in equilibrium, the “exclusive deal” offers determine retailers’
outside options, and thus how much profit is left for the manufacturers. In equilibrium, the two
manufacturers’ exclusive deal offers must be equally “generous.” Moreover, each manufacturer
must (weakly) prefer that the retailer does not choose the exclusive deal offer but rather the
one designed for common agency: If a manufacturer were to prefer the retailer to accept the
exclusive deal option over the common agency option, the manufacturer could profitably deviate
by making the exclusive deal option slightly more attractive, thereby inducing the retailer to
accept that option. This generates a multiplicity of equilibria in terms of how the profits are
shared between the upstream and downstream levels: The more generous is one manufacturer,
the more generous must be the other one. Only in the equilibrium with the least generous offers
is each manufacturer indifferent between the retailer choosing the common agency contract
(which is accepted in equilibrium) and the exclusive deal offered by the manufacturer (which is
not accepted).
The analysis also identifies bounds on how profits can be shared. While Proposition 3 shows
that cost-based two-part tariffs (where any incremental quantity is sold at cost) enables manu-
facturers to obtain exactly their contribution to industry profits, ∆◦, Proposition 4 establishes
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that manufacturers cannot obtain more, and can obtain much less; in particular, there are equi-
libria in which retailers appropriate all profits — as well as equilibria in which one manufacturer
obtains its contribution ∆◦ when the other one gets nothing. Note however that all these other
equilibria rely on tariffs that price the incremental quantity for exclusivity below cost: At least
one tariff ◦ must be such that ◦ (˜◦)− ◦ (◦)   (˜◦ − ◦), where ˜◦ denotes the quantity
that  would pick if it were to deviate and deal exclusively with;  would thus obtain less
profit if  were to move to exclusivity — by contrast, the equilibria giving manufacturers their
contribution ∆◦ are such that each  is indifferent as well between  buying ◦ from both
manufacturers, or ˜◦ exclusively from .
4 Exclusive Dealing
In this section, we analyze the effects of exclusive dealing provisions on the equilibrium outcome
and on welfare. These provisions include exclusive distribution contracts, which preclude the
manufacturer from selling to the rival retailer, and single branding contracts, which preclude
the retailer from buying from the other manufacturer. We first consider the case of a single
exclusive dealing provision that precludes trade between  and 2, and then that of two
exclusive dealing provisions that preclude trade between  and 2 and between  and 1.
Next, we make an excursion by analyzing an associated duopoly game without any vertical
aspects. We then use the insights from this game to study the incentives for firms to engage in
exclusive dealing. Finally, we provide a welfare analysis of the effects of exclusive dealing.
4.1 Equilibrium Outcomes
We begin by analyzing the equilibrium effects of a (pre-existing) exclusion dealing provision that
precludes trade between manufacturer  and retailer 2. Such a provision may be either an
exclusive distribution contract between  and 1, or a single branding contract between 
and 2.
The following proposition provides a characterization of the equilibrium quantities (which
we will index by the superscript “∗”):
Proposition 5 Suppose that a single exclusive dealing provision precludes trade between 
and 2 (i.e., ∗2 = 0). Then, under Assumptions (A.3) and (A.4):
• There exists an equilibrium supported by cost-based two-part tariffs.
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• In all equilibria,  signs a cost-based contract with 1, and signs cost-based contracts
with both 1 and 2; the equilibrium quantities, (∗1 ∗1 ∗2), are moreover positive and
uniquely defined by:
∗1 = argmax1 [ (1 
∗1 + ∗2)− ] 1 +  (∗1 + ∗2 1) ∗1
∗1 = argmax1 [ (1 + 
∗2 ∗1)− ] 1 +  (∗1 1 + ∗2) ∗1
and
∗2 = argmax2 [ (
∗1 + 2 ∗1)− ] 2.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The market outcome is thus that of an asymmetric duopoly, in which one firm offers both
goods  and , whereas the other offers only one of these goods. Following the same steps as
for Proposition 4, it can be checked that there exist multiple equilibria, which differ on how 1
shares its profit with the manufacturers. More precisely, let
Π∗1 = [ (∗1 ∗1 + ∗2)− ] ∗1 + [ (∗1 + ∗2 ∗1)− ] ∗1
denote the profit generated by 1 in equilibrium (some of which may be captured by the two
manufacturers), and
∆∗1 = Π∗1 −max1 {[ (1 + 
∗2 0)− ] 1} 
∆∗1 = Π∗1 −max1 {[ (1 
∗2)− ] 1}
’s and ’s contributions to this profit, respectively. We then have ∆∗1  ∆∗1  012 and:
• In equilibrium,  now always appropriates the profit generated by 2.
• As regards sharing the profit generated by 1, any tuple
³
∗1 ∗1
´
with ∗1 ∈
h
0∆∗1
i
for  and ∗1 ∈
h
∆∗1 −∆∗1∆∗1
i
for  can be sustained as an equilibrium out-
come.
12That ’s contribution is positive stems from ∗1  0, which implies
Π∗1 = max11 {[ (1 1 + 
∗2)− ] 1 + [ (1 + ∗2 1)− ] 1}
 max1 {[ (1 
∗2)− ] 1} 
That ’s contribution is larger than ’s follows from the fact that, from (A.2),  ( ∗2)   ( + ∗2 0) for
any  such that  ( ∗2)  0. To see this, note that  () = 
 +∗2
2 +  +
∗2
2 − 

is decreasing in  from
(A.2), and  ( ∗2) = 
 −∗2
2

whereas  ( + ∗2 0) = 
 +∗2
2

.
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Suppose now that (pre-existing) pairwise exclusive dealing provisions preclude trade between
 and 2 as well as between  and 1. For example,  and 1 as well as  and 2
may have signed exclusive distribution contracts with each other, or  and 2 as well as 
and 1 may have signed single branding contracts.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium (which we will index by the super-
script “∗∗”).
Proposition 6 Suppose that pairwise exclusive dealing provisions preclude trade between 
and 2 as well as between  and 1 (i.e., ∗∗2 = ∗∗1 = 0). Then under Assumption (A.3):
• There exists an equilibrium supported by cost-based two-part tariffs.
• In all equilibria:
—  and 1 as well as  and 2 sign cost-based contracts, and each manufacturer
fully appropriates the profit generated by its good.
— ∗∗1 = ∗∗2 = ∗∗  0, where ∗∗ is the unique solution to
 (∗∗ ∗∗)− + 1 (∗∗ ∗∗)∗∗ = 0
Proof. See Appendix F.
The market outcome is thus that of a standard duopoly, with one firm offering good  and
the other offering good . This equilibrium outcome can, for instance, be supported by cost-
based two-part tariffs. Finally, in contrast to the previous cases, equilibrium profits are here
unique as well, as manufacturers appropriate all profits.
4.2 Excursion: Associated Duopoly Game
Consider the following hypothetical duopoly game, denoted Γ2. There are two players, firms 1
and 2, and two goods,  and . Firm 1’s strategy consists in choosing the quantity 1 ∈ [0∞)
of good  to sell at the same time as firm 2 chooses the quantity 2 ∈ [0∞) of good . In
addition, firm 1 also sells an exogenous quantity ˆ1 of good  and firm 2 an exogenous quantity
ˆ2 of good , so that the profit functions of firms 1 and 2 are given by
Πˆ1 (1 2; ˆ1 ˆ2) ≡ [ (1 + ˆ2 ˆ1 + 2)− ] 1 + [ (ˆ1 + 2 1 + ˆ2)− ] ˆ1
and
Πˆ2 (1 2; ˆ1 ˆ2) ≡ [ (ˆ1 + 2 1 + ˆ2)− ] 2 + [ (1 + ˆ2 ˆ1 + 2)− ] ˆ2
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respectively. In the special case where ˆ2 = ˆ1 = 0, this game simplifies to a standard
differentiated goods Cournot duopoly, where each of the two goods is sold by only one firm.
For our main results, we will assume that the equilibrium of game Γ2 has the following
properties:
(P.1) Game Γ2 has a unique Nash equilibrium (˜1 (ˆ1 ˆ2)  ˜2 (ˆ1 ˆ2)).
(P.2) In equilibrium, the aggregate profit
Π (˜1 (ˆ1 ˆ2) + ˆ2 ˆ1 + ˜2 (ˆ1 ˆ2))
≡ [ (˜1 (ˆ1 ˆ2) + ˆ2 ˆ1 + ˜2 (ˆ1 ˆ2))− ] (˜1 (ˆ1 ˆ2) + ˆ2)
+ [ (ˆ1 + ˜2 (ˆ1 ˆ2)  ˜1 (ˆ1 ˆ2) + ˆ2)− ] (ˆ1 + ˜2 (ˆ1 ˆ2))
is uniquely maximized for ˆ1 = ˆ2 = 0; that is,
Π (˜1 (0 0)  ˜2 (0 0))  Π (˜1 (ˆ1 ˆ2) + ˆ2 ˆ1 + ˜2 (ˆ1 ˆ2))
whenever ˆ1 + ˆ2  0.
(P.3) The equilibrium quantity ˜1 (ˆ1 ˆ2) (resp., ˜2 (ˆ1 ˆ2)) is (weakly) decreasing in
ˆ2 (resp., ˆ1) .
These properties are satisfied in the case of linear demand. In Appendix G, we provide more
general sufficient conditions on demand that ensure that (P.1)-(P.3) do indeed hold.
4.3 Incentives to Engage in Exclusive Dealing
We now study firms’ incentive to engage in exclusive dealing. We first show that at least one
manufacturer-retailer pair benefits from signing an exclusive distribution contract (whether or
not this induces the other pair to do the same), and the other pair then benefits from doing
the same. Hence, absent any rule against exclusive dealing provisions, we would expect the
emergence of pairwise exclusivity.
We then consider the case of single-branding contracts. The incentives for a manufacturer-
retailer pair to sign such a contract are less clear, as doing so benefits the other pair but may
reduce the joint profit of the signing pair. In addition, once such a contract is in place, the
other manufacturer-retailer pair does not have an incentive to adopt any exclusivity provision;
the first pair, however, has an incentive to move to pairwise exclusivity, by complementing its
single-branding contract with an exclusive distribution provision.
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4.3.1 Exclusive Distribution
To analyze firms’ incentives to sign exclusive distribution contracts, we proceed as follows.
First, starting from an environment without exclusive dealing, we ask whether there exists
a manufacturer-retailer pair  −  that could raise its joint profit by signing an exclusive
distribution contract that prevents  from dealing with the rival retailer . Second, starting
from an environment in which the pair− has already signed such an exclusive distribution
contract, we ask whether the other pair,  − , can increase its joint profit by signing an
exclusive distribution contract that prevents  from dealing with . Despite the multiplicity
of equilibria (under either no or single exclusive dealing) in terms of rent shifting between
manufacturers and retailers, we obtain a strong result: Firms do have an incentive to engage in
exclusive dealing, no matter how profits are shared.
Proposition 7 Assume (A.3)-(A.4) and (P.1)-(P.3). Then:
• In any equilibrium that arises in the absence of exclusivity, there exists a manufacturer-
retailer pair  −  that can strictly increase its joint profit by signing an exclusive
distribution contract, regardless of:
— which equilibrium is selected under single exclusivity; and
— whether this induces the other pair to engage in exclusive dealing as well.
• In any equilibrium under single exclusive distribution between  − , the other pair
 − can strictly increase its joint profit by signing an exclusive distribution contract.
Proof. See Appendix H.
The intuition builds upon two observations: (i) Industry profits are larger under pairwise
exclusive dealing than under any other configuration; and (ii) a manufacturer-retailer pair, say
 −1, obtains a larger joint profit when it is the only pair that engages in exclusive distrib-
ution, than under pairwise exclusive dealing. The first observation is intuitive and follows from
(P.2).13 The second observation follows from the fact, in a single exclusive dealing equilibrium,
 and 1 must at least obtain what they could achieve by deviating to pairwise exclusivity,
and moreover face a less aggressive rival than in the pairwise exclusive dealing equilibrium:
∗2  ∗∗2, from (P.3).
13Recall that (P.2) follows in turn from the regularity assumptions provided in Appendix G.
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By construction, in the absence of exclusivity at least one manufacturer-retailer pair obtains
less than half of the equilibrium industry profit Π◦, which itself is (strictly) smaller than the
equilibrium industry profit Π∗∗ achieved under pairwise exclusive dealing. It follows from the
above observations that this pair would benefit from signing an exclusive distribution contract
— whether or not this induces the other pair to engage in exclusivity as well.
It also follows from the above observations that under single exclusive dealing, the pair that
is under exclusive distribution obtains a larger joint profit than the other pair. But then, this
other pair has an incentive to engage in exclusivity as well, so as to earn a bigger share (namely,
one-half) of a bigger pie (as the industry profit is maximal under pairwise exclusive dealing).
4.3.2 Single Branding
The above analysis suggests that the incentives to adopt single branding provisions are less
clear. To see this, consider an environment without exclusivity, and suppose that  and 
sign a single branding contract that prevents  from dealing with the rival manufacturer .
Intuitively, this eliminates intrabrand competition for good , and may thus increase in this
way total industry profit. However, the above analysis points out that the other manufacturer-
retailer pair, say  − , gets the bigger share of that profit; hence, even if total industry
profit is increased,  and  may obtain too small a share of that bigger pie, making single
branding unprofitable. Indeed, in the case of the linear demand considered at the end of Section
4.4, starting from a situation without exclusivity where the manufacturer-retailer pairs −
and  −  share the industry profit equally, then none of them can increase its joint profit
by opting for single branding; in the same vein,  and  cannot benefit from signing a single
branding contract if this does not allow  to extract more profit from the other retailer, 
(i.e., if ∗ ≤ ◦).
It also follows from the above analysis that, if one manufacturer-retailer pair, say  −,
opts for single branding, then the other pair, −, will not follow suit. Indeed, we have seen
that  and ’s joint profit is larger in the single exclusive dealing situation where  does
not deal , than in case of pairwise exclusivity. However,  and  would have an incentive
to complement their single branding contract with an exclusive distribution provision, in order
to move towards pairwise exclusivity, so as obtain again a bigger share of a bigger pie. By the
same token, starting from an environment without exclusivity, at least one pair (any pair that
does not get more than half of the industry profit) would have an incentive to engage in mutual
exclusivity, that is, to sign a contract involving both exclusive distribution and single branding,
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in order to move towards pairwise exclusivity.
4.4 Welfare Effects of Exclusive Dealing
We now turn to the welfare effects of exclusive dealing. For given quantities  and ,
consumer surplus can be expressed as
( ) ≡
Z 
0
 ( ) +
Z 
0
 ( 0) −  ( ) −  ( )
aggregate profit as
Π( ) ≡ [ ( )− ] + [ ( )− ]
and social welfare as
 ( ) ≡
Z 
0
[ ()− ]  +
Z 
0
[ ( 0)− ] 
Let ◦ = 2◦ denote the aggregate output per good in the absence of exclusive dealing,
∗∗ = ∗∗ that under pairwise exclusive dealing, and (∗ = ∗1∗ = ∗1 + ∗2) the aggregate
outputs when a single exclusive dealing provision precludes trade between  and 2 .
For the second part of our first welfare result, we require the following technical assumption
on demand (which holds with equality if demand is linear):
(A.5) For any ( ) ≥ 0 such that  ( )  0, we have
2 () £211 ( ) +222 ( )¤
≥ 1 () £212 ( ) +212 ( )¤ 
The first welfare result says that introducing a single exclusive dealing agreement raises
aggregate industry profit at the expense of consumer surplus and social welfare:
Proposition 8 Compared to the baseline case with no exclusive dealing, an exclusive deal-
ing provision that precludes trade between  and 2: i) under (A.4), reduces social wel-
fare,  (∗ ∗)   (◦ ◦); and ii) under (A.5), reduces consumer surplus, (∗ ∗) 
(◦ ◦), and increases aggregate profit, Π(∗ ∗) ≡ Π∗  Π◦ ≡ Π(◦ ◦).
Proof. See Appendix I.
The second welfare result says that pairwise exclusive dealing increases profits at the expense
of consumer surplus and social welfare:
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Proposition 9 Compared to the baseline case with no exclusive dealing, exclusive dealing provi-
sions that preclude trade between  and 2 and between  and 1: i) reduce both consumer
surplus and social welfare: (∗∗ ∗∗)  (◦ ◦) and  (∗∗ ∗∗)   (◦ ◦); and ii)
under (A.4), increase aggregate profit: Π(∗∗ ∗∗) ≡ Π∗∗  Π◦ ≡ Π(◦ ◦).
Proof. See Appendix J.
The intuition is straightforward. Exclusive dealing restricts the number of retailers selling any
given good, leading to less intense competition, lower outputs and higher prices. This increases
firms’ profits (as output levels remain above monopoly levels), but obviously harms consumers
and reduces total welfare (as prices remain above marginal cost).
Intuitively, we would expect the impact of exclusivity to be more important when goods 
and  are more differentiated. Indeed, exclusive dealing has no effect in the limit case of perfect
substitutes (as, in that case, the retailers do not care about whether they sell one good or both
of them), and enables instead firms to achieve the industry-wide monopoly outcome when goods
 and  face independent demands. To illustrate this, consider the case of linear demand:14
 () = 1−  + 
1 +  
where  reflects the degree of substitution between  and , and ranges from  = 0 (independent
demands) to  = 1 (perfect substitutes). Normalizing the production cost to  ≡ 0, we have:
∗∗ = ∗∗ = 1
2 +   
◦ = 2◦ = 2
3

∗∗ =  (∗∗ ∗∗) = 1
2 +   
◦ =  (◦ ◦) = 1
3

Hence, pairwise exclusivity reduces output and raises prices, and all the more so as goods  and
 become more differentiated: ∗∗ decreases, and ∗∗ increases, as  decreases.
Intuitively, we would also expect each exclusive dealing provision to contribute to increasing
profit, at the expense of consumers and allocative efficiency. This is indeed the case in the above
linear model. When a single exclusive dealing provision precludes trade between  and 2,
the equilibrium prices and quantities are uniquely defined and given by:
∗1 = 12  
◦ = 2
3
 ∗1 = 2− 6  
◦ = 1
3
 ∗2 = 1 + 3 
∗∗ = 1
2 +   
∗ =
1
2
− 
6
 ∗ = ◦ = 13 
14The demand is here normalized so as to ensure that its size remains constant (for symmetric configurations)
when the degree of product differentiation varies. In particular, the benchmark monopoly quantity (summing
over both goods),  = 12, is independent of .
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Figure 1: The figure depicts the industry profit (top curves) and consumer surplus
(bottom curves) as a function of the substitution parameter . The solid curves
represent the case of pairwise exclusivity; the dashed curves the case
of single exclusivity, and the bold line the non-exclusivity benchmark.
That is, starting from the baseline scenario with no exclusivity, shutting down the channel
−2 induces 1 to sell more of good , but not so much as to compensate for 2’s lost sales
of good ; this also induces 2 to sell more of good , a move partially offset by 1 reducing its
own sales of that good (both because it faces a more aggressive rival 2 for good , and because
1 itself sells more of the substitute good ). As one price increases, the other one remaining
constant, consumer surplus and social welfare decrease, whereas industry profit increases.
It can be checked that each exclusivity provision increases industry profit, and reduces both
consumer surplus and social welfare:
Π∗∗ = 2∗∗∗∗ = 2 1 + 
(2 + )2  Π
∗ = ∗∗ + ∗∗ = 17− 36  Π
◦ = 2◦◦ = 4
9

∗∗ =  (∗∗ ∗∗) = (1 + )
2
(2 + )2  
∗ =  (∗∗) = 25 + 772  
◦ =  (◦◦) = 4
9

 ∗∗ = ∗∗ +Π∗∗ = 3 + 4+ 
2
(+ 2)2  
∗ = Π∗ + ∗ = 59 + 5
72
  ◦ = ◦ +Π◦ = 8
9

This is illustrated by Figure 1, which further shows that the impact of each exclusivity provision
is also larger when the goods are more differentiated:
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5 Vertical Integration
In this section, we analyze the positive and normative effects of vertical integration. We begin
by considering the case of a single vertically integrated upstream-downstream pair, and then
turn to the case of pairwise vertical integration. We show that, under single vertical integration,
there exists an equilibrium in which the integrated firm forecloses its downstream rival; this
equilibrium thus replicates the outcome (in terms of retail prices and quantities) under single
exclusive dealing. That is, a vertical merger leads to the foreclosure of the rival retailer. We
also show that pairwise vertical integration yields a unique equilibrium outcome, in which each
vertically integrated firm forecloses its rival. The welfare analysis of vertical integration therefore
mirrors that of exclusive dealing: vertical integration reduces both consumer surplus and social
welfare.
We begin by considering the case where a single upstream-downstream pair, −1 say, is
vertically integrated. Our previous analysis allows us to provide a very partial characterization
of equilibrium:
Lemma 2 Suppose that  − 1 are vertically integrated whereas  and 2 are vertically
separated. Then, in equilibrium, the unintegrated manufacturer  signs a cost-based contract
with each retailer. The vector of equilibrium quantities, (∗1 ∗2 ∗1 ∗2), is thus such that
∗ = argmax [ ( + 
∗ ∗ + ∗)− ]  +  (∗ + ∗  + ∗) ∗
for all  6=  ∈ {1 2}.
Proof. This is an immediate implication of Lemma 1.
Intuitively, the integrated  does not need access to 2 to sell its good (any unit that 
sells through 2 could instead be sold directly through the downstream affiliate 1), and it has
moreover an incentive to protect its own retailer 1 from intrabrand competition. Indeed, the
following proposition shows that there exists an equilibrium in which the integrated firm will
not supply its downstream rival:
Proposition 10 Assume (P.1)-(P.3). Then, there exists an equilibrium in which:
•  offers 2 a quantity-forcing contract,
³
ˆ ˆ
´
, whereas  offers 1 a (cost-based)
quantity-forcing contract, (∗1  ∗1), and offers 2 to supply any quantity at cost (i.e.,
2() = , for any  ≥ 0).
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• 2 is indifferent between accepting both ’s and ’s contracts, or either one of them,
and rejects ’s offer;
• 1 is indifferent between accepting and rejecting ’s contract, and accepts it.
Proof. See Appendix K.
The equilibrium under single vertical integration of  −1, characterized by the proposi-
tion, replicates the outcome in terms of retail prices and quantities that would obtain under an
exclusive distribution contract between and 1 (or under a single branding contract between
 and 2). However, unlike in the case of exclusive dealing, the independent retailer 2 here
extracts some rents thanks to the competition between the two manufacturers for its business.
In equilibrium,  makes an attractive offer to 2, the anticipation of which prompts  to
make a generous offer to 2, which in turn prevents  from winning the competition for 2’s
business.
Proposition 10 extends the analysis of Hart and Tirole (1990) to the case of oligopolistic
upstream competition. As in the case of a pure upstream bottleneck, the integrated manufacturer
 completely forecloses the downstream rival 2, and monopolizes the distribution of its
product. By contrast with the case of a pure upstream bottleneck, the competition for 2’s
business leads  to offer a contract guaranteeing some rents to 2, which 2 however chooses
to reject. Interestingly, this can be contrasted with another situation considered by Hart and
Tirole, in which  would face a less efficient competitive fringe of suppliers, offering the same
input but facing a higher cost than . In that situation,  would end up supplying 2
(although on terms based on the higher cost of the competitive fringe). By contrast, here the
other supplier offers a differentiated good, and each manufacturer is “more efficient” than its
rival on the provision of its own input; as a result,  ends up not supplying 2. Finally, the
proposition also shows that, while the integrated manufacturer forecloses the downstream rival,
the integrated retailer keeps dealing with the independent manufacturer.
We now turn to the case where there are two vertically integrated firms,  − 1 and
 −2. Intuitively, both manufacturers have an incentive to protect their own retailers from
intrabrand competition. The following proposition shows that pairwise vertical integration leads
indeed to complete foreclosure of rivals, mirroring the outcome under pairwise exclusive dealing:
Proposition 11 Suppose −1 and  −2 are vertically integrated. If Properties (P.1)-
(P.3) hold, then there exists a unique equilibrium, (∗∗1 ∗∗2 ∗∗1 ∗∗2), in which moreover there is
no cross-selling: (∗∗1 ∗∗2 ∗∗1 ∗∗2) = (∗∗ 0 0 ∗∗), where ∗∗ ≡ argmax [ (∗∗)− ].
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Proof. See Appendix L.
The proposition shows that pairwise vertical integration leads to a strong form of foreclosure,
as each integrated firm refuses to deal with the other integrated firm. In particular, combined
with Lemma 2, it shows that pairwise vertical integration is “less competitive” than single
vertical integration. It follows from our previous welfare analysis that vertical integration harms
consumers and society. In particular, under pairwise vertical integration both prices are higher
(and consumer surplus as well as social welfare are thus lower) than under vertical separation.
From our analysis of exclusive dealing, it also follows that firms have an incentive to integrate
vertically: If no firm is vertically integrated, there exists a manufacturer-retailer pair, say−
1, that can increase their joint profit by merging. Moreover, if−1 are vertically integrated,
the remaining manufacturer-retailer pair−2 can also increase their joint profit by merging.
We conclude this section by noting that “complete foreclosure” arises here from the fact
that a single retailer suffices to serve the entire market. If it were not the case, e.g., due to
downstream capacity constraints or to differentiation among the retailers, then integrated man-
ufacturers would still wish to deal with downstream rivals in order to expand market coverage
or serve customer niches; in such situations, we would thus expect vertical integration to result
into partial rather then complete foreclosure. By the same token, in such situations vertical
integration (and partial foreclosure) is likely to be more profitable than exclusive dealing (and
thus complete foreclosure).15
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a tractable framework for the analysis of interlocking bilateral relation-
ships in vertically related markets. Key features of the framework are that upstream firms are
horizontally differentiated, contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to
the contracting parties, and any tariff (e.g., linear, two-part, quantity forcing, and so forth) can
be used. In the absence of exclusive dealing provisions and vertical integration, all channels are
active and involve cost-based (nonlinear) tariffs. Under mild regularity conditions, there exists a
unique equilibrium outcome in terms of retail prices and quantities; we also provide a complete
characterization of the equilibrium outcomes in terms of profit sharing between manufacturers
and retailers.
15See Rey and Tirole (2007) for an analysis of the impact of downstream differentiation on the extent of
foreclosure in the case of an upstream monopoly.
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We use this framework to shed some light on a long-standing debate on vertical foreclosure.
More specifically, we analyze the positive and normative effects of exclusive dealing and vertical
integration, and show that firms have an incentive to engage in exclusive dealing or vertical
integration to exert more market power, at the expense of consumers and society.
There are exciting avenues for future research. First, it would be natural to extend the
model to an arbitrary number of manufacturers and retailers, and to introduce upstream and/or
downstream firm heterogeneity. Second, it would be interesting to allow retailers to be horizon-
tally differentiated. We expect that, in this case, vertical integration no longer leads to complete
foreclosure of rival retailers, unlike exclusive dealing provisions. Third, it seems important to
extend the analysis to downstream price competition, which is however known to raise additional
issues for the treatment of out-of-equilibrium beliefs.16 Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the framework developed in this paper can be used to study the positive and normative effects of
other contractual arrangements, such as “fidelity rebates” based on market shares, MFN clauses,
or agency contracts.
16Passive beliefs appear to remain the most tractable approach in that case, but they become less compelling
— in particular, they no longer coincide with wary beliefs — and equilibrium existence is no longer guaranteed; see
Rey and Vergé (2004).
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Fix a candidate equilibrium, with associated equilibrium quantities ()==12 and accep-
tance decisions ()==12, with the convention that  = 1 if  and  are vertically
integrated and, when they are independent,  = 1 if the offer is accepted and  = 0 if it is not
(in which case  = 0). Suppose that an unintegrated  deviates and offers  a cost-based
two-part tariff ( ˜), where the fixed fee ˜ is as follows:
• if  is vertically integrated with  , then:
˜ = max
©£ ¡ +   + ¢− ¤ 
+
£ ¡ +  ˜ + ¢− ¤  +  £  ¡¢− ¤ª− − (1)
where − denotes the profit of the integrated firm− in the candidate equilibrium.
The terms in curly brackets represent the profit that the vertically integrated firm−
would make if  accepted ’s deviant offer and maintained the equilibrium quantity
, and  maintained the equilibrium quantities  and :
— the first two terms are the profits generated by, respectively, the channels  − 
and  −,
— whereas the third term is the profit that  generates in equilibrium through the
sales to the other, unintegrated retailer .
• if instead  is not vertically integrated, then:
˜ = max
©£ ¡ +   + ¢− ¤ 
+
£ ¡ +   + ¢  −   ¡¢¤ª−  (2)
where  denotes the profit that the unintegrated  makes in equilibrium. The terms
in curly brackets represent the profit that the unintegrated  would make if it accepted
’s deviant offer and maintained its acceptance decision  vis-à-vis  ’s contract offer
as well as the equilibrium quantity , and  maintained the equilibrium quantities 
and :
— the first term is the profit generated by the channel  −,
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— whereas the second term is the profit that  makes on its contract with  .
We first claim that  is willing to accept the deviant offer ( ˜):
1. Having passive beliefs, at the acceptance stage  continues to believe that its downstream
rival  has been offered the equilibrium contracts and will sell the equilibrium quantities
 and  in the continuation game.
2. By accepting ’s deviant offer,  can make the same profit as in the candidate equilib-
rium by sticking to its acceptance decision vis-à-vis ’s nondeviant offer and maintaining
the quantity  at its equilibrium level , and can do only better by optimizing over
these decisions.
3. If instead  rejects ’s deviant offer, it obtains the same profit as in the continuation
game following the rejection of’s equilibrium offer. By construction, this cannot exceed
’s equilibrium profit: it constitutes the equilibrium profit if in equilibrium  rejects
 , and must be (weakly) lower otherwise.
As  is willing to accept this deviant offer (and can be induced to do so, if needed, by slightly
reducing the fixed fee ˜), which gives  a profit equal to ˜, this deviation is unprofitable
only if ˜ ≤ , where
 =  [  ()− ]
denotes the equilibrium profit that  makes from selling through retailer . But then:
• If  is vertically integrated with  (implying  = 1), we can rewrite  as follows:
 =
©£ ¡ +   + ¢− ¤ 
+
£ ¡ +   + ¢− ¤  +  £  ¡¢− ¤ª− −
Using (1),  ≥ ˜ then implies  ∈ 
³
  
´
.
• If instead  is unintegrated, we can rewrite  as follows:
 = ©£ ¡ +   + ¢− ¤ 
+
£ ¡ +   + ¢  −   ¡¢¤ª− 
Using (2),  ≥ ˜ then implies  ∈ 
³
  
´
.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
From Proposition 1, we know that the equilibrium quantities satisfy ◦ ∈ 
³
◦ ◦ ◦
´
. We
first show that Assumptions (A.3)-(A.4) ensure that all quantities are positive; we then use
first-order conditions to characterize the unique, symmetric equilibrium outcome.
B.1 Interior solution
To see that all quantities are positive, suppose that ◦2, say, is zero.
Step 1: ◦1  0. Suppose otherwise that ◦1 = 0. By construction, we then have:
◦ = argmax [ ( + 
◦ 0)− ] 
Note that ◦1 = 0 would imply ◦ =  (◦2 0) ≤ , and thus ◦2 = 0 as well;17 but this would
therefore require  (0 0) ≤ , contradicting the viability condition (A.1). Thus, we can assume
that ◦1 is positive, and thus satisfies 1’s first-order condition which, using
1 = [ (1 + ◦2 1)− ] 1 + [ (1 1 + ◦2)− ] 1
and ◦1 = 0, is given by:
1
1
¯¯¯¯
()=(◦)
=  (◦ 0)− + 1 (◦ 0) ◦1 = 0
But then, a small increase in 1 would increase 1’s profit:
1
1
¯¯¯¯
()=(◦)
=  (0◦)− + 2 (◦ 0) ◦1
  (◦ 0)− + 1 (◦ 0) ◦1 = 0
where the inequality stems from (A.2) (2  1 , which also implies  (0)   ( 0) for
any   0).
Step 2: ◦2  ◦1. From Step 1, ◦1 is positive and therefore satisfies the first-order
condition
1
1
¯¯¯¯
()=(◦)
=  (◦ ◦)− + 1 (◦ ◦) ◦1 + 2 (◦ ◦) ◦1 = 0 (3)
17Otherwise, a slight reduction in 2 would increase 2’s profit ◦2 = (◦ − ) ◦2, since then
2
2

()=(◦)
= ◦ − + ◦21 (◦2 0)  ◦ −  ≤ 0
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From (A.2), 1 ≤ 0 and 2 ≤ 0 and thus  (◦◦) ≥   0; but (A.2) then implies
1 (◦ ◦)  0, which in turn yields  (◦ ◦)  .
Using
2 = [ (◦1 + 2 ◦1 + 2)− ] 2 + [ (◦1 + 2 ◦1 + 2)− ] 2
the first-order condition for ◦2 = 0 yields:
2
2
¯¯¯¯
()=(◦)
=  (◦ ◦)− + 2 (◦◦) ◦2 ≤ 0 (4)
Using (A.2) and  (◦ ◦)  , it follows that ◦2 is positive and thus satisfies the first-order
condition
2
2
¯¯¯¯
()=(◦)
=  (◦ ◦)− + 1 (◦ ◦) ◦2 = 0
implying  (◦ ◦)  .
Subtracting (3) from (4) yields:
2 (◦ ◦) (◦2 − ◦1) ≤ 1 (◦ ◦) ◦1
where 1  0 and 2  0 (from (A.2), as both prices are positive), and ◦1  0 (from Step
1); therefore, ◦2  ◦1.
Step 3: ◦1  0. Suppose otherwise that ◦1 = 0. In that case, ◦ = ◦2 and ◦ = ◦1
satisfy ◦ = ˆ (◦) and ◦ = ˆ (◦), where the best response function
ˆ () ≡ argmax
ˆ
nh

³
ˆ
´
− 
i
ˆ
o
is characterized by the first-order condition:
 (ˆ ()  )− + 1 (ˆ () ) ˆ () = 0
Assumption (A.3) ensures that this response function satisfies
−1  ˆ0 ()  0
Therefore, we must have ◦ = ◦ = ˆ◦, where ˆ◦ is such that ˆ◦ = ˆ
³
ˆ◦
´
, and thus satisfies:

³
ˆ◦ ˆ◦
´
− + 1
³
ˆ◦ ˆ◦
´
ˆ◦ = 0
But then, each retailer would want to sell the other brand as well:
1
1
¯¯¯¯
()=(◦)
=
2
2
¯¯¯¯
()=(◦)
= 
³
ˆ◦ ˆ◦
´
− + 2
³
ˆ◦ ˆ◦
´
ˆ◦  0
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as 
³
ˆ◦ ˆ◦
´
  from above, and thus 1
³
ˆ◦ ˆ◦
´
 2
³
ˆ◦ ˆ◦
´
 0 from (A.2). Hence,
◦1  0.
Step 4. It follows from the previous steps that ◦2, ◦1 and ◦1 must all be positive, and
thus satisfy the first-order conditions:
1
1
¯¯¯¯
()=(◦)
=  (◦ ◦)− + 1 (◦ ◦) ◦1 + 2 (◦ ◦) ◦1 = 0 (5)
1
1
¯¯¯¯
()=(◦)
=  (◦ ◦)− + 1 (◦ ◦) ◦1 + 2 (◦ ◦) ◦1 = 0 (6)
2
2
¯¯¯¯
()=(◦)
=  (◦ ◦)− + 1 (◦ ◦) ◦2 = 0 (7)
whereas the first-order condition for ◦2 = 0 yields:
2
2
¯¯¯¯
()=(◦)
=  (◦ ◦)− + 2 (◦◦) ◦2 ≤ 0 (8)
Subtracting (7) from (5) and (6) from (8) yields:
−1 (◦ ◦) (◦2 − ◦1) = −2 (◦ ◦) ◦1
−2 (◦ ◦) (◦2 − ◦1) ≥ −1 (◦ ◦) ◦1
The first condition yields ◦2  ◦1, and thus the two conditions can be rewritten as:
−1 (◦ ◦)
−2 ¡◦ ◦¢ = 
◦1
◦2 − ◦1 ≤
−2 (◦◦)
−1 ¡◦ ◦¢ 
This, in turn, implies
1 (◦ ◦) 1 (◦◦) ≤ 2 (◦ ◦) 2 (◦ ◦) 
a contradiction as 1  2  0 from (A.2). Hence, there is no equilibrium in which ◦2 = 0.
B.2 The equilibrium outcome is unique and symmetric
It follows from the above analysis that all equilibrium quantities are positive and thus satisfy
the first-order conditions. Adding the conditions for good , namely:
1
1
¯¯¯¯
()=(◦)
=  (◦◦)− + 1 (◦ ◦) ◦1 + 2 (◦ ◦) ◦1 = 0
2
2
¯¯¯¯
()=(◦)
=  (◦◦)− + 1 (◦ ◦) ◦2 + 2 (◦ ◦) ◦2 = 0
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implies that
 (◦ ◦) ≥   0
and
◦ = ˜ (◦) 
where  = ˜ () denotes the “best-response” function defined by
 ( ) ≡ 2 [ ( )− ] + 1 () + 2 ( ) = 0
Likewise, adding the first-order conditions for good  yields  (◦◦) ≥   0 and ◦ =
˜ (◦). The derivatives of  are given by:
1 ( ) = 31 (˜ ()  ) + 11 (˜ ()  ) ˜ () + 22 ( ˜ ())
2 ( ) = 22 (˜ ()  ) + 2 ( ˜ ()) + 212 (˜ ()  ) ˜ () + 21 ( ˜ ())
Assumptions (A.2)18 and (A.4) ensure that 1 ( )  2 ( )  0. Hence the reac-
tion function ˜ () is uniquely defined and such that
˜0 () = −2 ( )1 ( ) ∈ (−1 0)
It follows that the equilibrium is symmetric: ◦ = ◦ = ◦. The first-order conditions for
’s quantity choices, for  ∈ {1 2}, then yield:
−1 (◦ ◦) ◦ − 2 (◦ ◦) ◦ =  (◦◦)− 
−1 (◦ ◦) ◦ − 2 (◦◦) ◦ =  (◦◦)− 
and thus
◦ = ◦ = ◦ ≡ −  (
◦ ◦)− 
1 (◦ ◦) + 2 (◦ ◦) 
C Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a candidate equilibrium in which each manufacturer offers the cost-based two-part
tariffs ( ) = (∆◦), which accept it.
We first note that the continuation equilibrium is then such that both retailers sell ( ) =
(◦ ◦), for  = 1 2. From the proof of Proposition 2, this constitutes the unique candidate equi-
librium, and it satisfies all first-order conditions. It thus suffices to check that retailers’ profit
18Using demand symmetry (see footnote 2), (A.2) implies 1 ( )  2 ( ) = 2 ( ).
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functions are concave. Anticipating that its rival will sell (◦ ◦), by selling ( ) a retailer
obtains a profit (gross of the fixed fees) equal to
Π◦ ( ) ≡ [ ( + ◦  + ◦)− ]  + [ ( + ◦  + ◦)− ] 
The second-order derivatives of Π◦ (· ·) are given by:
211Π◦ ( ) = 21 ( + ◦  + ◦) + 211 ( + ◦  + ◦)  + 222 ( + ◦  + ◦) 
222Π◦ ( ) = 21 ( + ◦  + ◦) + 211 ( + ◦  + ◦)  + 222 ( + ◦  + ◦) 
212Π◦ ( ) = 2 ( + ◦  + ◦) + 2 ( + ◦  + ◦)
+212 ( + ◦  + ◦)  + 212 ( + ◦  + ◦) 
Assumption (A.4) then ensures that the profit function Π◦ is strictly concave, as 211Π◦ and
222Π◦ are both negative, and the determinant of the Hessian is positive: 211Π◦222Π◦ ¡212Π◦¢2. The assumption moreover yields 212Π◦  0, which will be used in the proof of
4.
Next, we note that each retailer is willing to carry both goods. Indeed, the fee  ◦ is such
that, if its rival were to accept both offers and sell (◦ ◦), then a retailer:
• Obtains the same profit, ◦, by accepting both manufacturers’ offers or only one of them:
◦ = 2 {[ (2◦ 2◦)− ] ◦ −  ◦} = max [ ( + 
◦ ◦)− ] ◦ −  ◦;
• Strictly prefers securing this profit to rejecting both offers:
◦
2
= [ (2◦ 2◦)− ] ◦ −  ◦
= max [ (
◦ +  ◦)− ]  − [ (2◦ 2◦)− ] ◦
 max [ (
◦ +  ◦)− ]  − [ (2◦ ◦)− ] ◦
≥ 0
Thus, if these contracts are offered, it is a continuation equilibrium for both retailers to
accept both manufacturers’ offers, and then to sell (◦ ◦). We now show that manufacturers
cannot profitably deviate from this candidate equilibrium. As the profit that a manufacturer
achieves with a retailer is not affected by its relation with the other retailer, without loss of
generality we can restrict attention to “one-sided” deviations, in which a manufacturer offers a
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deviating contract to one of the retailers. Furthermore, the above tariffs are profitable for the
manufacturers:
 ◦ = [ (2◦ 2◦)− ] 2◦ −max [ ( + 
◦ ◦)− ] 
= max {[ ( + 
◦  + ◦)− ]  + [ ( + ◦  + ◦)− ] }−max [ ( + 
◦ ◦)− ] 
 0
where the second equality comes from the definition of ◦ and the inequality comes from the fact
that the second optimization problem is more constrained than the first one (and the optimal
 and  are indeed both positive, as they are equal to ◦). It follows that a deviation cannot
be profitable if it is not accepted by the retailer; and since the retailer can secure its equilibrium
profit ◦ by accepting only the rival’s offer, it must be the case that the deviation increases the
joint profit of the manufacturer and of the retailer.
If the deviation induces the retailer to keep dealing with the other manufacturer, then the
joint profit of the manufacturer and of the retailer (gross of the manufacturer’s cost of supplying
◦ to the rival retailer, which is not affected by the deviation) cannot exceed
max {[ ( + 
◦  + ◦)− ]  + [ ( + ◦  + ◦)− ] } = [ (2◦ 2◦)− ] 2◦
which the two parties already obtain in the candidate equilibrium. Therefore, such a deviation
cannot be profitable.
If instead the deviation induces the retailer to reject the other manufacturer’s offer, then the
joint profit of the manufacturer and of the retailer (again gross of the manufacturer’s cost of
supplying ◦ to the rival retailer) cannot exceed
max {[ ( + 
◦ ◦)− ] }+  ◦ = max {[ ( + 
◦ ◦)− ] }+ [ (2◦ 2◦)− ] 2◦
−max [ ( + 
◦ ◦)− ] 
= [ (2◦ 2◦)− ] 2◦
which is again what they obtain in the candidate equilibrium. Therefore, such a deviation cannot
be profitable either, which concludes the argument.
D Proof of Proposition 4
Given the assumption on passive beliefs, we can focus on one particular retailer , taking as
given that the other retailer will sell (◦ ◦). Let
◦ ( ) ≡  ( + ◦  + ◦)  +  ( + ◦  + ◦) 
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denote the total revenue generated by  selling ( ). As shown in the proof of Proposition
3, the associated profit
Π◦ ( ) = ◦ ( )−  ( + )
is strictly concave in ( ) in the range where it is positive; this profit moreover reaches
its maximum at ( ) = (◦ ◦), where it is equal to half the aggregate industry profit,
Π◦ (◦ ◦) = Π◦2.
Let ◦ () denote the equilibrium tariff that  offers , ◦ ≡ ◦ (◦)− ◦ denote ’s
equilibrium profit from supplying , and ◦ ≡ Π◦2−◦−◦ denote ’s equilibrium profit.
Also, let
˜◦ ∈ argmax 
◦ ( 0)− ◦ ()
denote the output level that  would choose under exclusivity with , and ˜◦ ≡ ◦ (˜◦)−
˜◦ denote ’s associated profit (the corresponding profit for  is thus Π (˜◦ 0) − ˜◦ ). We
have:
Lemma 3 Under Assumptions (A.2)-(A.4), the output and profit levels satisfy, ˜◦  ◦ and
0 ≤ ◦ ≤ ∆◦ ≡ Π
◦
2
− Πˆ◦ (9)
for  = , where
Πˆ◦ ≡ max Π
◦ ( 0) 
and:
◦ = Π
◦
2
− ◦ − ◦ = Π◦ (˜◦ 0)− ˜◦ = Π◦ (˜◦ 0)− ˜◦  0 (10)
Proof. We first provide bounds on equilibrium payoffs, before turning to the comparison
between ˜◦ and ◦.
By construction, we have ◦ ≥ 0 for  = . Furthermore, if ◦  ∆◦ for some  ∈
{}, then the aggregate profit of  and the other supplier  (gross of the profit that 
makes with the other retailer), is such that :
◦ + ◦ = Π
◦
2
− ◦  Πˆ◦
But then,  could profitably deviate to exclusivity by offering a forcing contract of the form³
ˆ ˆ
´
, where ˆ ≡ argmax Π◦ ( 0) denote the bilaterally efficient output under exclusivity:
by accepting this offer (and only that one),  would generate a bilateral profit of Πˆ◦, which
can then be shared by an appropriate ˆ so as to ensure that both  and  benefit from the
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deviation. It follows that ◦ ◦ ≤ ∆◦, which in turn implies that the retailer obtains a
positive profit:
◦ = Π
◦
2
− ◦ − ◦ ≥ Π
◦
2
− 2
µΠ◦
2
− Πˆ◦
¶
= 2Πˆ◦ − Π
◦
2
 0
where the inequality stems from the fact that, from Assumption (A.2), goods  and  are
(imperfect) substitutes. Finally, (10) follows from the fact, already noted in the main text, that
in equilibrium  must be indifferent between accepting both manufacturers’ offers, or only one
(either one).
We now establish ˜◦  ◦. By a revealed preference argument, we have:
◦ (˜◦ 0)− ◦ (˜◦) ≥ ◦ (◦ 0)− ◦ (◦) 
◦ (◦ ◦)− ◦ (◦) ≥ ◦ (˜◦ ◦)− ◦ (˜◦) 
Therefore:
◦ (˜◦ 0)− ◦ (◦ 0) ≥ ◦ (˜◦ ◦)− ◦ (◦ ◦)
⇐⇒
Z ˜◦
◦
1◦ ( 0)  ≥
Z ˜◦
◦
1◦ ( ◦) 
⇐⇒
Z ˜◦
◦
Z ◦
0
212◦ ( )  ≤ 0
As ◦  0 and 212◦ = 212Π◦  0 from the proof of Proposition 3, it follows that ˜◦ ≥ ◦.
Assume now that ˜◦ = ◦, which implies ◦ (◦) = ◦ (˜◦) and thus ◦ = ˜◦; hence,
from condition (10), both  and  are indifferent between  accepting both suppliers’ equilib-
rium offers, or only ’s offer. But then,  could profitably deviate to exclusivity by offering
a forcing contract of the form
³
ˆ ˆ
´
: by accepting this offer (and only that one),  would
increase their bilateral profit from Π◦ (◦ 0) to Πˆ◦ = max Π◦ ( 0), which can then be shared
by an appropriate ˆ so as to ensure that both  and  benefit from the deviation. Therefore,
˜◦  ◦.
Corollary 1 There is no equilibrium in which a supplier offers a single forcing contract.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 3, which implies that equilibrium contracts must
offer at least two relevant options, ◦ and ˜◦ 6= ◦.
We next show that, for any equilibrium based on tariffs {◦ ()  ◦ ()}, there exists an
equilibrium, yielding the same profits, in which each  offers a pair of forcing contracts:
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Lemma 4 Let {◦ ()  ◦ ()} denote the tariffs signed by retailer  in a given equilibrium,
with associated equilibrium profits ◦, ◦ and ◦ = Π◦2 − ◦ − ◦, and let ˜◦ ≡
{(◦ ◦ (◦))  (˜◦ ◦ (˜◦))} denote the corresponding pair of forcing contracts, respectively
based on the equilibrium output level ◦ and on the output level ˜◦ that  would choose under
exclusivity with . Then there exists an equilibrium in which each  offers the tariff ˜◦,
leading  to pick the forcing contract (◦ ◦ (◦)); this alternative equilibrium moreover yields
the same profits ◦, ◦ and ◦.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium based on tariffs {◦ ()  ◦ ()}, and suppose that each
supplier offers instead ˜◦ = {(◦ ◦ (◦))  (˜◦ ◦ (˜◦))}. By construction,  is willing to
accept both offers, in which case it is willing to choose the “option” (◦ ◦ (◦)) from each ˜◦;
furthermore, from Lemma 3  is indifferent between doing so and accepting only either ’s
offer, in which case it would choose the option (˜◦ ◦ (˜◦)). We now show that manufacturers
have no incentive to deviate.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to deviations in which the deviating
manufacturer offers a single forcing contract. As ◦ ≥ 0 from Lemma 3, to be profitable
the deviant offer must be accepted, either alone or in combination with one of the two options
offered by  ; as  ’s equilibrium contract offers contain, among other options, the options³
◦ ◦ (◦)
´
and
³
˜◦  ◦
³
˜◦
´´
this implies that the deviant offer would also be accepted in
the original equilibrium, as  could then combine it with even more options. But then, as by
construction there is no profitable deviation in the original equilibrium {◦ ()  ◦ ()}, there
is no profitable deviation from {˜◦ ˜◦} either.
From now on, without loss of generality we will consider equilibria in which each  offers
two options: that is, ◦ =
n
(◦  ◦) 
³
˜◦ ˜ ◦
´o
.
Lemma 5 The contracts
³
◦ =
n
(◦  ◦) 
³
˜◦ ˜ ◦
´o´
= support an equilibrium if and
only if the associated profits
³
◦ =  ◦ − ◦ ˜◦ = ˜ ◦ − ˜◦
´
= and 
◦ = Π◦2−◦−
◦ satisfy (9), (10) and
◦ − ˜◦ ≤ Π
◦
2
−Π (˜◦)  (11)
where
Π () ≡ max Π
◦ ( )
denotes the maximal aggregate profit that  can generate, conditional on selling  units of good
.
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Proof. We first check that  is indeed willing to accept both contracts, and to pick the
options {(◦  ◦)  (◦  ◦)}:
• From (10),  is willing to accept the offers, and is indifferent between accepting {(◦  ◦)  (◦  ◦)},n³
˜◦ ˜ ◦
´o
, or
n³
˜◦ ˜ ◦
´o
;
• In addition,  prefers accepting {(◦  ◦)  (◦  ◦)}, which yield ◦, to accepting only
(◦  ◦): This amounts to
Π◦
2
− ◦ − ◦  Π◦ (◦ 0)− ◦
or:
◦  Π
◦
2
−Π◦ (◦ 0)  (12)
which follows from (9), as the RHS of (12) is strictly larger than ∆◦.
• Using (10), the previous observation also implies that, if  were to accept ’s contract
only, then it would pick the option
³
˜◦ ˜ ◦
´
rather than (◦  ◦).
• Finally,  indeed prefers accepting {(◦  ◦)  (◦  ◦)} to accepting
n
(◦  ◦) 
³
˜◦  ˜ ◦
´o
:
(11) implies that the joint profit of  and  is larger in the equilibrium configuration; as 
is indifferent between the two scenarios (either way, it gets ◦ =  ◦ − ◦),  must prefer
sticking to {(◦  ◦)  (◦  ◦)}.
We now turn to deviations by the manufacturers:
•  has no incentive to deviate by making an unacceptable offer (or no offer), as ◦ ≥ 0.
•  has no incentive to deviate to exclusivity. To see that, it suffices to note that, as 
can secure its equilibrium profit by accepting  ’s offer only, to be profitable a deviation must
increase the joint profit of  and ; but along the equilibrium path, this joint profit (gross of
the profit that  makes with the other retailer) satisfies:
◦ + ◦ = Π
◦
2
− ◦ ≥ Π
◦
2
−∆◦ = Πˆ◦
where Πˆ◦ is the maximal profit that can be achieved under exclusivity. Note that, as  could
induce  to switch to exclusivity by slightly reducing ˜ ◦, we must therefore have ◦ ≥ ˜◦.
•  cannot profitably deviate by inducing  to combine the deviant offer with ’s equi-
librium option
³
◦  ◦
´
. As the profit generated by  is maximal along the equilibrium path
(that is, Π◦2 = max Π◦ ( )), a deviation by that induces  to combine the deviant
offer with  ’s equilibrium option
³
◦  ◦
´
cannot be profitable, as this would maintain  ’s
profit at the equilibrium level (that is,  would obtain a  ◦ − ◦ = ◦), and a deviation
cannot lower ’s profit either.
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• Finally,  cannot profitably deviate by inducing  to combine the deviant offer with ’s
alternative option
³
˜◦  ˜ ◦
´
. As  can secure its equilibrium profit by accepting ’s offer only,
such a deviation could only be profitable if it increased the joint profit of  and  (gross of
the profit that  makes with the other retailer), that is, only if :
Π◦
¡ ˜◦ ¢− ˜◦  Π◦2 − ◦
which is ruled out by (11) (written for ).
We now turn to existence. We first note that relying on the bilateral efficient quantity
˜◦ = ˆ = argmax {Π◦ ( 0)} for the “exclusive deal” option restricts somewhat the range
of admissible profits, as (11) is then more demanding than (9): To see this, note that (10) yields
˜◦ = Π◦ (ˆ 0) + ◦ + ◦ − Π
◦
2

so that (11) amounts to:
◦ ≤ ◦ + ◦ +Π◦ (ˆ 0)−Π (ˆ)
⇔ ◦ ≥ Π (ˆ)−Π◦ (ˆ 0) = max Π
◦ (ˆ )−Π◦ (ˆ 0)  0
We now show that  ’s equilibrium profit can however cover the full range [0∆◦] by relying on
a “large enough” quantity ˜◦ for ’s exclusive deal option.
Lemma 6 For any ◦ ◦ ∈ [0∆◦], there exists an equilibrium yielding profits ◦, ◦
and ◦ = Π◦2− ◦ − ◦.
Proof. We first note that the expression Π () − Π◦ ( 0) = max˜ Π◦ ( ˜) − Π◦ ( 0)
decreases as  increases. Using the envelope theorem, and letting  () = argmax˜ Π◦ ( ˜)
denotes ’s “best response” to selling a quantity  of the other brand, we have:

 [Π
 ()−Π◦ ( 0)] = 1Π◦ (  ())− 1Π◦ ( 0)
=
Z ()
0
12Π◦ ( ˜) ˜
which is negative as long as  ()  0, as 12Π◦  0 from the proof of Proposition 3. From (A.1),
 () = 0 for  large enough; let ¯ denote the smallest such quantity,19 which by construction is
19 It is characterized by
 (◦ ◦ + ¯)− + 2 (◦ ◦ + ¯) ¯ = 0
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also the smallest quantity satisfying
Π (¯) = Π◦ (¯ 0) 
For (˜◦ ˜◦) ≥ (¯ ¯), (10) yields
˜◦ = Π◦ (˜◦ 0) + ◦ + ◦ − Π
◦
2

Hence (11) becomes:
◦ − ˜◦ = ◦ + Π
◦
2
− ¡Π◦ (˜◦ 0) + ◦ + ◦¢ = Π◦2 −Π◦ (˜◦ 0)− ◦ ≤ Π◦2 −Π (˜◦)
⇐⇒ ◦ ≥ Π (˜◦)−Π (˜◦ 0) = 0
and thus follows from (9). Therefore, from Lemma 5, contracts of the form
³
◦ =
n
(◦  ◦) 
³
˜◦ ˜ ◦
´o´
=,
where ˜◦ ≥ ¯, support an equilibrium if and only if the associated profits satisfy conditions (9)
and (10).
Conversely, for any ◦ ◦ ∈ [0∆◦], the contracts
³
◦ =
n
(◦  ◦) 
³
˜◦ ˜ ◦
´o´
=,
where
 ◦ = ◦ + ◦
˜◦ ≥ ¯
˜ ◦ = ◦ + ˜◦, where ˜◦ = Π◦ (˜◦ 0) + ◦ + ◦ − Π
◦
2

support an equilibrium with profits
³
◦ ◦
´
for the manufacturers and ◦ = Π◦2−◦−
◦ for .
Finally, we have:
Lemma 7 There exist equilibria in which each , too, is indifferent between  accepting
{(◦  ◦)  (◦  ◦)} or
n³
˜◦  ˜ ◦
´o
, and these equilibria yield the same equilibrium profits
as the equilibrium in two-part tariffs, namely,  and  both obtain their full contribution to
industry profits: ◦ = ◦ = ∆◦.
Proof. Suppose ◦ = ˜◦. Together with conditions (10), this yields ◦ + ◦ =
Π◦ (˜◦ 0) and ◦ = Π◦2 − Π◦ (˜◦ 0). The first equality implies Π◦ (˜◦ 0) = Πˆ (and
thus ˜◦ = ˆ), as otherwise  would have a profitable deviation to exclusivity. The second
equality then implies ◦ = Π◦2− Πˆ = ∆◦.
Conversely, the contracts (◦ = {(◦ ◦ +∆◦)  (ˆ ˆ +∆◦)})= support an equilibrium
in which each  obtains ◦ = ˜◦ = ∆◦.
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E Proof of Proposition 5
We start with the characterization of the equilibrium contracts and quantities, before establishing
the existence of an equilibrium in two-part tariffs.
That contracts are cost-based follows from Lemma 1. We now show that, under Assumptions
(A.1)-(A.4), the equilibrium quantities (∗1 ∗1 ∗2) are uniquely defined and all positive. The
quantities are those that would be induced in a duopoly game where firm 1’s problem is given
by
max11 [ (1 1 + 2)− ] 1 + [ (1 + 2 1)− ] 1
and firm 2’s problem by
max2 [ (1 + 2 1)− ] 2
The first order conditions are given by:
 (∗ ∗)− + ∗11 (∗∗) + ∗12 (∗ ∗) ≤ 0
 (∗∗)− + ∗11 (∗ ∗) + ∗12 (∗∗) ≤ 0
 (∗ ∗)− + ∗21 (∗∗) ≤ 0
where the first-order condition of quantity ∗ holds with equality if ∗  0, and where ∗ ≡ ∗1
and ∗ ≡ ∗1 + ∗2.
We first establish that all quantities are indeed positive, implying that the first-order condi-
tions hold with equality.
(i)  (∗ ∗)  . To see this, suppose otherwise that  (∗ ∗) ≤ . Then, the first-
order condition of ∗2 implies that ∗2 = 0. Moreover, we must also have ∗1 = 0; if not, firm
1 could profitably deviate by reducing 1. Hence, ∗ = 0 ≤ ∗. By (A.2), we thus have
 (∗ ∗) ≤ , implying that ∗1 = 0 (otherwise, firm 1 could profitably deviate by reducing
1). Hence,  (0 0) ≤ , contradicting (A.1).
(ii) ∗2  0. As  (∗ ∗)  , firm 2 could otherwise profitably deviate by choosing
2  0 small enough such that  (∗ + 2∗)  .
(iii)  (∗ ∗)  . To see this, suppose otherwise that  (∗∗) ≤ . It follows that
∗1 = 0. (If not, firm 1 could profitably deviate by setting 1 = 0; if ∗1 = 0, firm could combine
this deviation by choosing 1  0 sufficiently small such that  (∗ + 1 ∗ − ∗1)  .)
Hence, ∗ = 0 ≤ ∗. By (A.2), we thus have  (∗ ∗) ≥  (∗ ∗)  , a contradiction.
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(iv) ∗1  0. Suppose otherwise that ∗1 = 0. We have:
0 ≥  (∗ ∗)− + ∗12 (∗ ∗)
  (∗ ∗)− + ∗11 (∗ ∗)
where the first inequality follows from ∗1 = 0, and the second by (A.2) and ∗  ∗. It
follows that ∗1 = 0. But as  (∗ ∗)  , firm 1 could then profitably deviate by setting
1  0 sufficiently small such that  (∗ + 1 ∗)  .
(v) ∗1  0. Suppose otherwise that ∗1 = 0. The induced outcome thus coincides with the
equilibrium outcome in a duopoly in which firm 1 sells only good  and firm 2 sells only good
. Under Assumption (A.3), this implies that ∗ = ∗, as shown in Proposition 6. We thus
have:
 (∗ ∗)− +∗2 (∗∗)   (∗ ∗)− +∗1 (∗ ∗)
= 0
where the inequality follows from (A.2) and the equality from the first-order condition of ∗1 =
∗. But then firm 1 could profitably deviate by slightly raising 1.
Having established that all quantities (∗1 ∗1 ∗2) are strictly positive, implying that each
of the three first-order conditions holds with equality, we now show that the quantities are
unique.
Let
ˆ ≡  (∗ ∗) + ∗21 (∗ ∗)
denote the marginal cost level that would induce firm 2 to produce just zero units of good 
if it could produce that good at marginal cost b, given that aggregate outputs are (∗ ∗).
Equilibrium quantities are thus characterized by the following system of equations:
 (∗ ∗)− + ∗11 (∗∗) + ∗12 (∗∗) = 0 (13)
 (∗∗)− + ∗11 (∗ ∗) + ∗12 (∗ ∗) = 0 (14)
 (∗ ∗)− + ∗21 (∗∗) = 0 (15)
 (∗ ∗)− ˆ+ ∗22 (∗∗) = 0 (16)
Adding equations (14) and (15), we obtain:
(∗ ∗; ) ≡ 2 [ (∗∗)− ] +∗1 (∗∗) +∗2 (∗ ∗) = 0 (17)
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Similarly, adding equations (13) and (16) yields:
(∗ ∗;b) ≡ 2 (∗ ∗)− − ˆ+∗1 (∗ ∗) +∗2 (∗ ∗) = 0 (18)
Let () be such that (() ; ) = 0, and ˆ( ˆ) be such that (ˆ( ˆ) ; ˆ) = 0.
Hence, aggregate equilibrium outputs (∗ ∗) satisfy ∗ = ˆ(∗ ˆ) and ∗ = (∗). Using
the implicit function theorem, we have for  6=  ∈ {},
0() = 1ˆ( ˆ) = −22 (  ) +
2
12 (  ) + 2 ( ) +212()
31 (  ) +211 ( ) +222 ( ) 
(A.2) and (A.4) imply that 0() = 1ˆ( ˆ) ∈ (−1 0). It follows that the aggregate equilib-
rium outputs (∗ ∗) are unique. From the first-order conditions the individual outputs are
unique as well.
We now show that there exists an equilibrium in which all equilibrium contracts are cost-
based two-part tariffs of the form
³
∗  ∗
´
=
³
∆∗
´
, where ∆∗ denotes ’s contribution
to the profit generated by , namely:
∆∗1 = (∗ − ) ∗1 + (∗ − ) ∗1 −max1 {[ (1 + 
∗2 0)− ] 1} 
∆∗1 = (∗ − ) ∗1 + (∗ − ) ∗1 −max1 {[ (1 
∗2)− ] 1} 
∆∗2 = (∗ − ) ∗2
We first note that the continuation equilibrium is then such that 1 sells (1 1) =
(∗1 ∗1) and 2 sells 2 = ∗2. From the first part of this proof, this constitutes the unique
candidate equilibrium, and it satisfies all first-order conditions. And going through the same
steps as in the proof of Proposition 3, it is easy to check that retailers’ profit functions are again
concave.20
Next, we note that each retailer is willing to accept all offers made. Indeed, the fees are such
that each, anticipating this behavior for its rival:
• 1 is indifferent between accepting both manufacturers’ offers or either one (either one);
• 2 is indifferent between accepting ’s offer or not.
20 It suffices to note that retailers’ profit functions are similar to the previous function Π ( ), replacing
the rival’s equilibrium quantities (◦ ◦) with the new equilibrium quantities (∗1 ∗1) or ∗2.
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It thus suffices to check that 1 is strictly better-off accepting the manufacturers’ offers
rather than rejecting both of them; indeed, we have:
∗1 = (∗ − ) ∗1 + (∗ − ) ∗1 −∆∗1 −∆∗1
= max1 {[ (1 
∗2)− ] 1}+max1 {[ (1 + 
∗2 0)− ] 1}
− [(∗ − ) ∗1 + (∗ − ) ∗1]
= max1 {[ (1 
∗2)− ] 1}− [ (∗1 ∗1 + ∗2)− ] ∗1
+max1 {[ (1 + 
∗2 0)− ] 1}− [ (∗1 + ∗2 ∗1)− ] ∗1
 max1 {[ (1 
∗2)− ] 1}− [ (∗1 ∗2)− ] ∗1
+max1 {[ (1 + 
∗2 0)− ] 1}− [ (∗1 + ∗2 0)− ] ∗1
≥ 0
Thus, if these contracts are offered, it is a continuation equilibrium for retailers to accept all
offers, and then to sell the equilibrium quantities identified above. We now show that manufac-
turers cannot profitably deviate from this candidate equilibrium.
We first note that the above tariffs are profitable for the manufacturers, as each manufacturer
contributes positively to the profits generated by the retailers.21 It follows that a deviation
cannot be profitable if it is not accepted by the retailer. But then,  cannot profitably deviate
in its offer to 2, as it already appropriates all the profit that 2 can generate. Likewise, no
 can profitably deviate in its dealing with 1, as: (i)  and 1 cannot increase their joint
profit above the equilibrium level, as does not obtain more than its contribution to the profit
generated by 1; and (ii) following a deviation by , 1 can still secure its equilibrium profit
by accepting only  ’s offer.
F Proof of Proposition 6
We first prove the second part of the Proposition, before establishing the existence of an equi-
librium based on two-part tariffs.
21For instance, ∆∗1 can be expressed as
∆∗1 = {[ (∗1 ∗1 + ∗2)− ] ∗1 + [ (∗1 + ∗2 0)− ] ∗1}−max1 {[ (1 + 
∗2 0)− ] 1}
= max11
{[ (1 1 + ∗2)− ] 1 + [ (1 + ∗2 0)− ] 1}−max1 {[ (1 + 
∗2 0)− ] 1} 
which is positive as ∗1  0.
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In the second part of the Proposition, the assertion on cost-based contracts is an immediate
implication of Lemma 1. And as retailers would obtain zero profit by rejecting the offers made
by the manufacturers, in equilibrium the manufacturers fully appropriate the profit generated
by their goods.
To see that (A.3) implies that the equilibrium quantities are unique and symmetric, note
that the first-order condition of the retailer carrying manufacturer ’s good is
Ψ( ) ≡  ( )− + 1 ( ) = 0
We have Ψ(0) =  (0 ) − , 1Ψ( ) = 21 ( ) + 211 ( ) ≤ 0 (with
strict inequality if  ()  0) by (A.2), and Ψ( )  0 for  sufficiently large by (A.1).
Hence, the best-response to  selling  units of output, (), is given by () = 0 if
 (0)  , and by the unique solution to Ψ(() ) = 0 otherwise. For  such that
 (0) ≥ , we have

 () = −
2Ψ( )
1Ψ( ) = −
2 ( ) +212 ( )
21 () +211 ( ) 
(A.3) implies that −1    0, which in turn implies that an equilibrium, if it exists, is
unique and symmetric. To establish existence, it suffices to note that Ψ() is continuous in
, and satisfies Ψ(0 0)  0 and, from (A.1), Ψ()  0 for  sufficiently large. Hence, there
exists ∗∗ such that Ψ (∗∗ ∗∗) = 0.
We now turn to the first part of the Proposition, and consider a candidate equilibrium in
which both manufacturers offer the cost-based two-part tariff (∗∗  ∗∗) = (Π∗∗ ), where
Π∗∗ = [ (∗∗ ∗∗)− ]∗∗
denotes the profit generated by a retailer. The retailers are willing to accept those contracts, in
which case they each put ∗∗ on the market and break even. Furthermore, each manufacturer
obtains all the profits generated by its good, which is moreover maximal given the output level
∗∗ of the other good; it follows that there is no profitable deviation.
G Sufficient Conditions for Properties (P.1)-(P.3)
We provide sufficient assumptions on the inverse demand which, together with (A.1) and (A.2),
yield Properties (P.1)-(P.3). In particular, throughout this section we will rely on the following
assumption:
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(B.1) For any   ≥ 0 such that  ( )  0, and for any ( ) ∈ [0 ] × [0  ], we
have:
21 () + 211 () + 222 (  )
 2 () + 212 ( ) + 212 (  )
 0
In the case of linear demand, (B.1) simplifies to 21  2  0, and is thus implied by
(A.2).
G.1 Property (P.1)
We first show that the above assumption yields existence and uniqueness:
Proposition 12 Under Assumption (B.1), the game Γ1−1 has a unique Nash equilibrium (˜1 ˜2).
Proof. The derivative of firm ’s profit, Πˆ, with respect to  is (for  6=  ∈ {1 2}):
Φ(;  ˆ ˆ) ≡  ( + ˆ ˆ + )−+1 ( + ˆ ˆ + )+ˆ2 (ˆ +   + ˆ) 
and is thus such that:
Φ
 (;  ˆ ˆ) = 21 ( + ˆ ˆ + )+
2
11 ( + ˆ ˆ + )+ˆ222 (ˆ +   + ˆ) 
From (A.2), Φ (;  ˆ ˆ) = 0 implies  ( + ˆ ˆ + ) ≥  ( 0), and thus, from
(B.1), Φ (;  ˆ ˆ)  0; it follows that firm ’s best-response
(; ˆ1 ˆ2) = argmax Πˆ (1 2; ˆ1 ˆ2)
is single-valued. It is moreover positive whenever
 (ˆ ˆ + )  − ˆ2 (ˆ +  ˆ) 
in which case it is characterized by the first-order condition Φ (;  ˆ ˆ) = 0. Differenti-
ating this first-order condition with respect to  and  then yields:

 (; ˆ ˆ) = −

  (19)
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where
 ≡ 21 ( + ˆ ˆ + )
+211 ( + ˆ ˆ + ) + ˆ222 (ˆ +   + ˆ)
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
=(;ˆˆ)

 ≡
2 ( + ˆ ˆ + )
+212 ( + ˆ ˆ + ) + ˆ212 (ˆ +   + ˆ)
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
=(;ˆˆ)

As    0 from (B.1), (19) implies
−1    0
Hence there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, which is moreover “stable” in the usual sense.
G.2 Property (P.2)
Let
∗∗ ≡ argmax [ (
∗∗)− ]
denote the “duopoly” equilibrium output per good in game Γ1−1 when ˆ2 = ˆ1 = 0. (From
Proposition 12, we know that ∗∗ exists and is unique.)
We now provide an additional condition on demand that ensures that an increase in either
ˆ1 or ˆ2 increases the total output of goods  and . We then show that any such increase
in aggregate output beyond that of the duopoly outcome (∗∗ ∗∗) reduces aggregate profit,
implying (P.2).
(B.2) For any   ≥ 0 such that  ( )  0 and  (  )  0, and for any  ∈ [0 ],
we have
21 ( ) + 211 ( ) +222 (  )
 2 ( ) + 2 ( ) + 212 () +212 ( )  (B.2.a)
and in addition, for any  ∈ [0  ]:
1 ( )
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
21 (  )− 2 (  )
+ ¡211 (  )− 212 (  )¢
+ ¡222 ( )− 212 ( )¢
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
 2 ( )
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
21 ( )− 2 ( )
+ [ − ] ¡211 ( )− 212 ( )¢
+ [ −  ] ¡222 (  )− 212 ( )¢
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦  (B.2.b)
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In the case of linear demand (B.2) simplifies to 1  2 and (1 − 2 ) (21 − 2 )  0,
and is thus implied by (A.2). We now show that (B.1) and (B.2) together imply that any increase
in ˆ, for  ∈ {2 1}, increases total output:
Lemma 8 Let ˜ (resp., ˜) denote the total equilibrium output of good  (resp., good )
in game Γ1−1. If (B.1) and (B.2) hold, then an increase in either ˆ2 or ˆ1 leads to a strict
increase in the total equilibrium output ˜ + ˜.
Proof. The claim is obvious (although in a weak sense, for the “decreasing” part) when
˜1 = ˜2 = 0, as then ˜ = ˆ2 and ˜ = ˆ1. Consider now the case where ˜  0 whereas
˜ = 0, for  6=  ∈ {1 2}. We then have ˜ = ˆ, and thus ˜ˆ = 0 ˜ˆ = 1. Turning
to ˜ = ˜ + ˆ, the first-order condition for ˜ is:
 (˜ + ˆ ˆ)− + ˜1 (˜ + ˆ ˆ) + ˆ2 (ˆ ˜ + ˆ) = 0
or:

³
˜ ˆ
´
− + ˜1
³
˜ ˆ
´
= ˆ1
³
˜ ˆ
´
− ˆ2
³
ˆ ˜
´

Differentiating this equation with respect to ˜ and ˆ yields:
ˆ˜ = 1
³
˜ ˆ
´
ˆ −
h
2
³
ˆ ˜
´
+ ˆ
i
ˆ
where
ˆ = 21
³
˜ ˆ
´
+ ˜211
³
˜ ˆ
´
+ ˆ222
³
ˆ ˜
´

ˆ = 2
³
˜ ˆ
´
+ ˜212
³
˜ ˆ
´
+ ˆ212
³
ˆ ˜
´

Assumptions (B.1) yields ˆ  0, and thus:
˜
ˆ =
1
³
˜ ˆ
´
ˆ  (20)
˜
ˆ = −
2
³
˜  ˆ
´
+ ˜
ˆ 
Therefore, as ˜ = ˆ:

³
˜ + ˜
´
ˆ =
˜
ˆ =
1
³
˜ ˆ
´
ˆ  0

³
˜ + ˜
´
ˆ = 1 +
˜
ˆ = 1−
2
³
ˆ ˜
´
+ ˜
ˆ  0
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where the inequalities stems from ˆ  0 and Assumptions (A.2) and (B.2.a), which yield
1
³
˜ ˆ
´
 0 and ˆ  2
³
ˆ ˜
´
+ ˆ.
Let us now consider the case where ˜1 ˜2  0, and are thus characterized by the first-order
conditions:
 (˜1 + ˆ2 ˆ1 + ˜2)− + ˜11 (˜1 + ˆ2 ˆ1 + ˜2) + ˆ12 (ˆ1 + ˜2 ˜1 + ˆ2) = 0
 (ˆ1 + ˜2 ˜1 + ˆ2)− + ˜21 (ˆ1 + ˜2 ˜1 + ˆ2) + ˆ22 (˜1 + ˆ2 ˆ1 + ˜2) = 0
or, in terms of total equilibrium outputs ˜ = ˜1 + ˆ2 and ˜ = ˆ1 + ˜2:

³
˜ ˜
´
− + ˜1
³
˜ ˜
´
= ˆ21
³
˜ ˜
´
− ˆ12
³
˜ ˜
´


³
˜ ˜
´
− + ˜1
³
˜ ˜
´
= ˆ11
³
˜ ˜
´
− ˆ22
³
˜ ˜
´

Differentiating these equations with respect to
³
˜ ˜
´
and (ˆ2 ˆ1) yields:
˜˜ + ˜˜ = 1
³
˜ ˜
´
ˆ2 − 2
³
˜ ˜
´
ˆ1
˜˜ + ˜˜ = −2
³
˜ ˜
´
ˆ2 + 1
³
˜ ˜
´
ˆ1
where, for  6=  ∈ {1 1}
˜ = 21
³
˜ ˜
´
+ ˜211
³
˜ ˜
´
+ ˆ222
³
˜  ˜
´

˜ = 2
³
˜ ˜
´
+ ˜212
³
˜ ˜
´
+ ˆ212
³
˜  ˜
´

Under Assumption (B.1), these coefficients satisfy ˜  ˜; the determinant  = ˜˜ − ˜˜
is therefore positive, and thus:
˜
ˆ =
˜1
³
˜ ˜
´
+ ˜2
³
˜ ˜
´
  (21)
˜
ˆ = −
˜1
³
˜ ˜
´
+ ˜2
³
˜ ˜
´
 
Therefore, we have:

³
˜ + ˜
´
ˆ =
³
˜ − ˜
´
1
³
˜ ˜
´
−
³
˜ − ˜
´
2
³
˜ ˜
´
 
Assumption (B.2.b) ensures that the numerator, too, is positive, which concludes the proof.
Next we show that, in symmetric outcomes, increasing the output of each good beyond the
“duopoly” output ∗∗ reduces aggregate profit:
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Lemma 9 Suppose that (B.1) holds, and consider a market outcome in game Γ1−1 where the
total output of each good is equal to . Then, the aggregate profit Π() = 2[ () − ]
is strictly decreasing in  for all  ≥ ∗∗.
Proof. This is obvious when  is so large that  () = 0. When instead  ()  0,
then the derivative of the aggregate profit with respect to per-good output  is
Π()
 = 2 [ ()− +1 () +2 ()] 
We have:
Π()

¯¯¯¯
=∗∗
= 2∗∗2 (∗∗∗∗)  0
where the inequality stems from (A.2). In addition:
1
2
2Π()
2 =

 [ ()− +1 () +2 ()]
= [21 () +11 () +22 ()]
+
£2 () + ¡212 () + 212 ()¢¤+ 2 ()
where the last term is negative from (A.2) and the two terms in brackets are negative from
(B.1). Hence 2Π()2  0, and thus Π()  0 for  ≥ ∗∗
We now show that, under Assumption (B.2.a), aggregate profit decreases when total output
becomes asymmetrically distributed:
Lemma 10 Suppose (B.2.a) holds. Then, for a fixed level of aggregate output  + = 2,
the aggregate profit Π( ) = [ () − ] + [ () − ] is maximal for
 =  = .
Proof. Let us fix the total output  + = 2, and consider the impact of a variation
in  (thus compensated by a mirror variation in  , for  6=  ∈ {}). The aggregate profit
being symmetric in  and , its derivative with respect to , holding  + fixed, can
be expressed as
Π( )

¯¯¯¯
+=2
= Ψ( )−Ψ(  ) (22)
where
Ψ( ) ≡ Π( ) =  ()− +1 ( ) +2 (  )
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The RHS of (22) is equal to zero when  =  = ; we now show that it is negative whenever
   . To see this, consider the derivative of Ψ with respect to , holding  + fixed:
Ψ( )

¯¯¯¯
+=2
=
Ψ( )
 −
Ψ( )

= 21 ( ) +211 () +2212 (  )
− £2 ( ) + 2 (  ) +212 ( ) +212 ( )¤
 0
where the inequality follows from (B.2.a). Hence, if    = +2   , then Ψ() 
Ψ()  Ψ(  ), implying that (22) is negative; it follows that, keeping total output
 + = 2 constant, the aggregate profit Π( ) is maximal for  =  = .
Combining the above three lemmas yields:
Proposition 13 Under Assumptions (B.1)-(B.2), the game Γ1−1 has property (P.2).
Proof. Lemmas 9 and 10 together imply that Π( )  Π(∗∗ ∗∗) whenever  +
  2∗∗; the conclusion then follows from Lemma 8.
G.3 Property (P.3)
For Property (P.3), we require another condition on demand:
(B.3) For any   ≥ 0 such that  ( )  0 and  (  )  0, and for any  ∈ [0 ],
we have:
1 ( ) + 211 ( ) +222 (  )  0 (B.3.a)
and in addition, for any  ∈ [0  ]:£2 + 2 + ( − ) 212 + 212¤
× £2 + ( − ) 212 + 212¤ 
£
21 + ( − ) 211 + 222
¤
× £1 + ( − ) 211 + 222¤ 
(B.3.b)
where  ≡  ( ).
In the case of linear demand, (B.3) simplifies to (2 )2  (1 )2, which holds by (A.2).
Proposition 14 Assume (B.1) and (B.3) hold. Then, the game Γ1−1 has Property (P.3).
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Proof. By symmetry, it suffices to show that, say, ˜ˆ1 ≤ 1. This is obvious when
˜2 = 0, as then ˜ = ˆ1. Consider now the case where ˜2  0. If ˜1 = 0, then from (20):
˜
ˆ1 =
1
³
˜ ˆ2
´
ˆ 
Assumptions (A.2), (B.1) and (B.3.a) together imply ˆ  1
³
˜ ˆ2
´
 0, and thus
˜ˆ1  1.
When instead ˜1  0, then from (21):
˜
ˆ1 =
˜1
³
˜ ˜
´
+ ˜2
³
˜ ˜
´
 
where   0 under Assumption (B.1). Hence, this expression is less than one if and only ifh
2 + 2 +
³
˜ − ˆ2
´
212 + ˆ1212
i
×
h
2 +
³
˜ − ˆ1
´
212 + ˆ2212
i

h
21 +
³
˜ − ˆ2
´
211 + ˆ1222
i
×
h
1 +
³
˜ − ˆ1
´
211 + ˆ2222
i

which holds under Assumption (B.3.b).
H Proof of Proposition 7
Let Π◦, Π∗, and Π∗∗ denote the equilibrium industry profit under no exclusive dealing, single
exclusive dealing, and pairwise exclusive dealing, respectively. From (P.2), we know that Π∗∗ 
Π∗Π◦. In the absence of exclusive dealing, at least one pair, say  − 1, makes a weakly
lower joint profit than the other pair, i.e., Π◦−1 ≤ Π◦2 ≤ Π◦−2 . We show below that,
no matter how profits are shared, the pair  − 1 would benefit from  not dealing with
2, and in response the other pair,  −2, would benefit from  not dealing with 1; i.e.:
Π∗−1  Π◦−1 and Π∗∗−2  Π∗−2 , where Π◦− , Π∗− and Π∗∗− respectively
denote the equilibrium joint profit of the pair− under no exclusivity, under single exclusive
dealing where  does not deal with 2, and under pairwise exclusive dealing.
We first note that, under single exclusivity, and 1 must obtain at least what they could
get by deviating to pairwise exclusivity, that is:
Π∗−1 ≥ max1 [ (1 
∗2)− ] 1 (23)
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Indeed,  could otherwise profitably deviate by offering a forcing contract (ˆ1 ˆ1), where
ˆ1 ≡ argmax1 [ (1 ∗2)− ] 1 and ˆ1 = ∗1+, where   0 sufficiently small. Clearly,
1 would find it profitable to accept this offer, proving the claim.22
This, in turn, implies that single exclusivity gives the pair  − 1 more than half of the
profit under pairwise exclusivity:
Π∗−1 ≥ max1 [ (1 
∗2)− ] 1
 max1 [ (1 
∗∗2)− ] 1 = Π∗∗−1 
where the second inequality follows from (P.3), which implies ∗2  ∗∗2, and (A.2).
Using (P.2), we thus have:
Π∗−1  Π∗∗−1 =
Π∗∗
2
 Π
◦
2
≥ Π◦−1 
which thus implies that, starting from no exclusivity,  and 1 have an incentive to engage
in single exclusivity.
Furthermore, using again (P.2), we have:
Π∗∗−2 =
Π∗∗
2
 Π
∗
2
 Π∗ −Π∗−1 = Π∗−2 
where the second inequality follows from
Π∗−1  Π∗∗−1 =
Π∗∗
2
 Π
∗
2

It follows that, in response to  and 1 opting for single exclusivity,  and 2 have also an
incentive to engage in exclusive dealing.
Note finally, by construction, the pair  −1 obtains a larger joint profit under pairwise
exclusivity than in the absence of any exclusivity:
Π◦−1 ≤
Π◦
2
 Π
∗∗
2
= Π∗∗−1 
Therefore,  and 1 do have an incentive to opt for exclusivity, even if this induces  and
2 to engage in exclusive dealing as well.
221 may find it profitable to combine ’s deviant offer with the equilibrium contract offered by  . If so,
this can only increase 1’s incentive to accept ’s deviant offer, without affecting ’s deviation profit.
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I Proof of Proposition 8
Using the same notation as in the proof of Proposition 5, consider the Cournot duopoly game
where firm 1 produces both goods  and  at marginal cost  and firm 2 produces good  at
marginal cost ˆ and good  at marginal cost , and the two firms compete in quantities. Let³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
denote the solution to:
ˆ (ˆ) = ˆ
³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ
´
 (24)
ˆ (ˆ) = 
³
ˆ (ˆ)
´
 (25)
where ˆ and are as defined in the proof of Proposition 5. Note that (◦ ◦) =
³
ˆ ()  ˆ ()
´
and (∗ ∗) =
³
ˆ (ˆ∗)  ˆ (ˆ∗)
´
, where
ˆ∗ ≡  (∗ ∗) + ∗21 (∗ ∗)
We can thus interpret the move from (◦ ◦) to (∗ ∗) as the evolution of the equilibrium³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
as ˆ increases from  to ˆ∗.
We first consider the effects on output. Differentiating (24) and (25) with respect to ˆ,
ˆ and ˆ yields:
ˆ − ˆ
³
ˆ ˆ
´
ˆ = ˆ
³
ˆ ˆ
´

ˆ = 0
³
ˆ
´
ˆ
and thus:
ˆ0 (ˆ) =
ˆ

³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ
´
1− ˆˆ
³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ
´
0
³
ˆ (ˆ)
´  0
−ˆ0 (ˆ)  ˆ0 (ˆ) = 0
³
ˆ (ˆ)
´
ˆ0 (ˆ)  0
It follows that, under (A.4), introducing an exclusive dealing agreement on product  leads to
a reduction in the output of  and, to a lesser extent, to an increase in the output of product
:
∗  
∗ +∗
2
 ◦  ∗
We now turn to the effects on social welfare. Recall that total welfare is equal to
 ( ) =  ( )−  − 
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and thus

 ( ) =

 ( )−  =  ( )− 
We now show that
ˆ (ˆ) ≡
³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
decreases as ˆ increases. We have:
ˆ 0 (ˆ) = 
³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
ˆ0 (ˆ) + 
³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
ˆ0 (ˆ)
=
∙ 

³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
− 
¸
ˆ0 (ˆ) +
∙ 

³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
− 
¸
ˆ0 (ˆ)
=
h

³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
− 
i
ˆ0 (ˆ) +
h

³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
− 
i
0
³
ˆ (ˆ)
´
ˆ0 (ˆ)
≤
h

³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
− 
³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´i
ˆ0 (ˆ) 
where the inequality uses ˆ  , ˆ0 (ˆ)  0, and the fact that Assumptions (A.2) and (A.4)
imply 0 ()  −1. As ˆ0 (ˆ)  0, to conclude the argument, it thus suffices to establish that
ˆ  ˆ; we have:

ˆ
³
ˆ − ˆ
´
=
h
1
³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
− 2
³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´i
ˆ0 (ˆ)
−
h
1
³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
− 2
³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´i
ˆ0 (ˆ)
 0
where the inequality stems from Assumptions (A.2) — which, using symmetry, implies 1 ( ) 
2 (  ) = 2 ( ) (see footnote 2) — and (A.4), which imply ˆ0 (ˆ)  0  ˆ0 (ˆ)).
As ˆ = ˆ =  ◦ for ˆ = , it follows that ˆ  ˆ for any ˆ  .
Hence, we have that, under (A.4), introducing an exclusive dealing agreement decreases
welfare.
We can use the same approach for consumer surplus. Using
 ( ) = ()−Π () 
we have:

 ( ) =

 ( )−
Π
 ( )
=  ()− − [ ()− + 1 ( ) + 2 ( ) ]
= −1 ( ) − 2 (  ) 
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Letting
ˆ (ˆ) ≡ 
³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
denote consumer surplus in the equilibrium of the duopoly game, we have:
ˆ0 (ˆ) = 
³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
ˆ0 (ˆ) + 
³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
ˆ0 (ˆ)
= − [1 ( ) + 2 ( )] ˆ0 (ˆ)− [1 ( ) + 2 ( )] ˆ0 (ˆ)
= −
n
1 () + 2 ( ) + [1 () + 2 ()]0
³
ˆ (ˆ)
´o
ˆ0 (ˆ)
= −
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 ( )
h
1 + 2 ()1 ()0
³
ˆ (ˆ)
´i
+1 ()
h
0
³
ˆ (ˆ)
´
+ 2 ( )1 ( )
i
⎫
⎬
⎭ ˆ
0 (ˆ) 
As ˆ0 (ˆ)  1 ()  2 ()  0 and 0 ()  −1, it follows that ˆ0 (ˆ)  0 if (A.5) holds.
We thus have that, under (A.4) and (A.5), introducing an exclusive dealing agreement de-
creases consumer surplus as well as social welfare.
We now turn to the effects on industry profit. For ˆ = ˆ∗, ∗2 = 0 and thus the industry
profit in the duopoly game coincides with the “true” industry profit, based on the actual cost :
Π∗ = (∗ − )∗ + (∗ − )∗
Therefore, to compare Π∗ with Π◦, it suffices to study how the industry profit, based on true
costs, evolves with ˆ in the duopoly game. Thus, let define:
Πˆ (ˆ) ≡
³

³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
− 
´
ˆ (ˆ) +
³

³
ˆ (ˆ)  ˆ (ˆ)
´
− 
´
ˆ (ˆ) 
We have:
Πˆ0 (ˆ) =
h

³
ˆ ˆ
´
− + 1
³
ˆ ˆ
´
ˆ + 2
³
ˆ ˆ
´
ˆ
i
ˆ0
+
h

³
ˆ ˆ
´
− + 1
³
ˆ ˆ
´
ˆ + 2
³
ˆ ˆ
´
ˆ
i
ˆ0
which, using the FOCs for 1’s outputs ˆ1 and ˆ1:

³
ˆ ˆ
´
− + 1
³
ˆ ˆ
´
ˆ1 + 2
³
ˆ ˆ
´
ˆ1 = 0

³
ˆ ˆ
´
− + 1
³
ˆ ˆ
´
ˆ1 + 2
³
ˆ ˆ
´
ˆ1 = 0
can be written as:
Πˆ0 (ˆ) =
h
1
³
ˆ ˆ
´
ˆ2 + 2
³
ˆ ˆ
´
ˆ2
i
ˆ0 +
h
1
³
ˆ ˆ
´
ˆ2 + 2
³
ˆ ˆ
´
ˆ2
i
0
³
ˆ
´
ˆ0
=
nh
1
³
ˆ ˆ
´
+ 2
³
ˆ ˆ
´
0
³
ˆ
´i
ˆ2 +
h
2
³
ˆ ˆ
´
+ 1
³
ˆ ˆ
´
0
³
ˆ
´i
ˆ2
o
ˆ0
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The first term within bracket is negative, as 1
³
ˆ ˆ
´
 2
³
ˆ ˆ
´
 0 and0
³
ˆ
´

−1. As ˆ0  0, it follows that Πˆ0 (ˆ)  0 if the second term within brackets is non-positive, i.e.,
if:
2
³
ˆ ˆ
´
+ 1
³
ˆ ˆ
´
0
³
ˆ
´
≤ 0
which amounts to Assumption (A.5). Hence, under (A.4) and (A.5), introducing an exclusive
dealing agreement increases industry profit at the expense of consumer surplus and social welfare.
J Proof of Proposition 9
We first use a revealed preference argument to show that ∗∗ ≤ ◦. Recall that ∗∗ = ∗∗ and
◦ = 2◦ are such that
∗∗ = argmax [ (
∗∗)− ] 
◦
2
= argmax
∙

µ◦
2
+ ◦
¶
− 
¸
 +
∙

µ
◦ 
◦
2
+ 
¶
− 
¸ ◦
2

Hence, we have
[ (∗∗ ∗∗)− ]∗∗ ≥ [ (◦ ∗∗)− ]◦ (26)
and
[ (◦ ◦)− ]◦ ≥ [ (∗∗ ◦)− ]
µ
∗∗ − 
◦
2
¶
+ [ (◦ ∗∗)− ] 
◦
2
= [ (∗∗ ◦)− ]∗∗ + [ (◦ ∗∗)−  (∗∗ ◦)] 
◦
2

If ∗∗  ◦, the last term on the RHS is positive from (A.2), implying
[ (◦ ◦)− ]◦ ≥ [ (∗∗◦)− ]∗∗ (27)
Combining (26) and (27) yields
[ (∗∗ ∗∗)−  (∗∗ ◦)]∗∗ ≥ [ (◦ ∗∗)−  (◦◦)]◦
i.e., Z ∗∗
◦
∗∗2 (∗∗ ) ≥
Z ∗∗
◦
◦2 (◦ )
which is equivalent toZ ∗∗
◦
Z ∗∗
◦
h
2 (˜) + ˜212 (˜)
i
˜ ≥ 0
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(A.2) implies that the term in brackets is strictly negative, a contradiction. Hence, we must
have ∗∗ ≤ ◦.
Next, suppose that ∗∗ = ◦. The first-order conditions of the above maximization problems
(for ∗∗ = ∗∗and ◦ = ◦2) then yield:
 (◦ ◦)−  = − [1 (◦ ◦) + 2 (◦ ◦)] 
◦
2
= −1 (◦ ◦)◦
implying 1 (◦ ◦) = 2 (◦ ◦), and thus contradicting (A.2). Hence, we must have
∗∗  ◦.
It follows that consumer surplus is greater in the absence of exclusive dealing, as  ()
increases with :
 ()
 = −2 [1 () + 2 ()] 
which is positive from (A.2).
Exclusive dealing also harms welfare, as  () increases with  as long as  ()  :
 ()
 =  ()− +
Z 
0
2 () +  ( 0)− 
=  ()− +
Z 
0
2 ( ) +  ( 0)− 
= 2 [ ()− ] 
where the second equality follows from the fact that demand symmetry implies that 2 () ≡
2 ( ). To conclude the argument, it suffices to note that  () is decreasing in  from
(A.2), and that the first-order condition for ◦ yields  (◦ ◦)  :
 (◦◦)−  = − [1 (◦ ◦) + 2 (◦ ◦)] 
◦
2
 (28)
where (A.2) implies that the term in brackets is strictly negative, and thus the LHS is positive.
Finally, to show that Π∗∗  Π◦, it suffices to note that the industry-wide aggregate profit
Π () is concave in  under (A.4), and maximal to   ∗∗:
1
2
2Π ()
 =
£
21 () + 211 ()+ 222 ()
¤
+
£
22 () + 2212 ()
¤ 
where both expressions in brackets on the RHS are negative under (A.4), and the first-order
derivative, evaluated at ∗∗, satisfies:
Π ()

¯¯¯¯
=∗∗
= 2∗∗2 (∗∗ ∗∗) 
where the RHS is negative from (A.2).
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K Proof of Proposition 10
K.1 Candidate equilibrium
We first characterize some of the properties of the candidate equilibrium described in Proposition
10.
K.1.1 Equilibrium quantities
The equilibrium output levels satisfy:
∗1 ∗1 = arg max11 {[ (1 1 + 
∗2)− ] 1 + [ (1 + ∗2 1)− ] 1} 
∗2 = argmax2 {[ (
∗1 + 2 ∗1)− ] 2} 
The equilibrium profits are thus equal to:
∗−1 = [ (∗1 ∗1 + ∗2)− ] ∗1 +  (∗1 + ∗2 ∗1) ∗1 −  ∗1
∗2 = [ (∗1 + ∗2 ∗1)− ] ∗2
∗ =  ∗1 − ∗1
K.1.2 Equilibrium fees
Determination of  ∗1 In equilibrium, 1 must be indifferent between rejecting or accepting
’s offer:
• 1 should not benefit from rejecting the offer, otherwise it would do so;
• conversely, if 1 was strictly better off accepting the offer, then could slightly increase
its fee: with passive beliefs 1 would then still accept the offer, making ’s deviation
profitable.
If 1 rejects ’s offer, it will sell ˜1 units of good , where:
˜1 ≡ argmax1 [ (1 
∗2)− ] 1
and thus obtain a profit equal to:
˜−1 ≡ [ (˜1 ∗2)− ] ˜1
Therefore, the fee  ∗1 should be such that ∗−1 = ˜−1 , or:
 ∗1 = [ (∗1 ∗1 + ∗2)− ] ∗1 +  (∗1 + ∗2 ∗1) ∗1 − [ (˜1 ∗2)− ] ˜1
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This in particular ensures that ’s equilibrium profit is non-negative:
∗ =  ∗1 − ∗1
= [ (∗1 ∗1 + ∗2)− ] ∗1 + [ (∗1 + ∗2 ∗1)− ] ∗1 − [ (˜1 ∗2)− ] ˜1
= max11 {[ (1 1 + 
∗2)− ] 1 + [ (1 + ∗2 1)− ] 1}−max1 [ (1 1 + 
∗2)− ] 1
≥ 0 (29)
Determination of
³
ˆ ˆ
´
The described equilibrium is such that 2 must obtain its equi-
librium profit ∗2 by accepting only ’s contract
³
ˆ ˆ
´
; conversely, 2 should not obtain
more profit by dealing with both manufacturers. As  offers to supply 2 at cost, this in
turn implies that ˆ should be “large enough” to ensure that, conditional on selling ˆ units of
good , 2 does not want to sell any positive quantity of good . Assumptions (A.1) and (A.2)
ensure that such large values exist for ˆ; if 2’s profit is quasi-concave in 2, then a necessary
and sufficient condition is that accepting ’s contract lowers the marginal revenue for good 
below its cost, i.e.
 (∗1 ∗1 + ˆ) + 2 (∗1 + ˆ ∗1) ˆ ≤  (30)
Remark 1 We are considering "quantity forcing" contracts where the retailer commits itself to
sell the agreed quantity. If 2 only commits itself to buy the quantity ˆ, we would also need to
check that it is willing to put all the quantity on the market; if 2’s profit is quasi-concave in
2 and 2, then a necessary and sufficient condition is:
 (∗1 + ˆ ∗1) + 1 (∗1 + ˆ ∗1) ˆ ≥ 0 (31)
As 2 could obtain  (∗1 + ˆ ∗1) ˆ−ˆ by deviating and selecting’s offer
³
ˆ ˆ
´
instead
of ’s offer, we must have:
ˆ =  (∗1 + ˆ ∗1) ˆ − [ (∗1 + ∗2 ∗1)− ] ∗2
Remark 2 The payment ˆ thus satisfies:
ˆ = max2 { (
∗1 + ˆ ∗1 + 2) ˆ + [ (∗1 + 2 ∗1 + ˆ)− ] 2}−max2 {[ (
∗1 + 2 ∗1)− ] 2} 
Intuitively, this implies that ˆ ≥ 0 if (31) holds. Indeed, when differentiating 2’ deviation profit
with respect to ˆ, the envelope theorem yields:
2
ˆ =  (
∗1 + ˆ ∗1 + ˆ2) + 1 (∗1 + ˆ ∗1 + ˆ2) ˆ + 2 (∗1 + ˆ2 ∗1 + ˆ) ˆ2
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where ˆ2 denotes 2’s best response output of good  when selling ˆ units of good  (thus, for
ˆ large enough, ˆ2 = 0). Assuming that this marginal profit decreases in ˆ, (31) ensures that
ˆ ≥ 0.
K.2 Deviations
The above characterization of equilibrium quantities and fees ensures that retailers have no
profitable deviation, neither at the acceptance stage nor at the product market competition
stage. We thus now focus on manufacturers’ deviations at the offer stage.
K.2.1 Deviations by 
Given the passive beliefs assumption, it suffices to consider one-sided deviations. Also, by con-
struction such a one-sided deviation cannot be profitable if it is not accepted, as in equilibrium
 makes a non-negative profit with both 1 and 2.
Consider first a deviant offer to 1. Such a deviation cannot reduce−1’s payoff, which
it can secure by rejecting ’s offer. But it cannot increase the joint profit that  generates
with  −1 through 1’s sales either, as the equilibrium contract offered to 1 is bilaterally
efficient.
Consider now a deviant offer to 2. Again, such a deviation cannot reduce 2’s payoff, which
it can secure by rejecting ’s offer and accepting instead ’s offer. And it cannot increase
the joint profit that  generates with 2 either, as the equilibrium contract offered to 2 is
bilaterally efficient, regardless of whether 2 accepts or rejects ’s offer.
K.2.2 Deviations by  −1
Consider first a deviant offer by  −1 that induces 2 to reject it Suppose first
that, in the continuation equilibrium, 2 accepts’s offer. If 1 also accepts’s offer, then
the continuation equilibrium quantities are (∗1 ∗1 ∗2); −1 thus obtains its equilibrium
profit, making the deviation unprofitable. If instead 1 rejects ’s offer then, from (P.3), in
the continuation equilibrium  puts on the market a larger quantity 2  ∗2, and thus
 −1 thus obtains less than its equilibrium profit, making again the deviation unprofitable.
Therefore, if such a deviation is profitable, it must induce 2 to reject ’s offer. We can
distinguish two cases, depending on 1’s acceptance decision of ’s offer:
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• If 1, too, rejects ’s offer, then it will sell 1 units of good , so as to maximize
[ (1 0)− ] 1
and thus such that  =  (1 0)  . But then,  =  (0 1)   (1 0)   by
Assumption (A.2), which in turn implies that 2 would rather accept ’s offer and sell
a positive quantity of good , in contradiction with 2’s supposed rejection of’s offer.
• If instead 1 accepts ’s offer, then it will sell ∗1 units of good  and 1 units of
good , so as to maximize
[ (1 ∗1)− ] 1 +  (∗1 1) ∗1 −  ∗1
By revealed preference, this must exceed the profit it could achieved by rejecting ’s
offer and selling only good , which implies:
 (∗1 1) ∗1 ≥  ∗1 +max1 [ (1 0)− ] 1 − [ (
1 ∗1)− ] 1
  ∗1 +max1 [ (1 0)− ] 1 − [ (
1 0)− ] 1
≥ ∗1
where the strict inequality follows from Assumption (A.2) and the last inequality stems
from (29). Therefore,  (∗1 1)  , which again implies that 2 would rather accept
’s offer and sell a positive quantity of good , in contradiction with 2’s supposed
rejection of ’s offer.
Consider now a deviant offer by −1 that is accepted by 2 together with ’s
offer Let ¯ denote the quantity of good  sold by 2 in the continuation equilibrium.
Suppose first that, in the continuation equilibrium, 1 also keeps accepting ’s offer.
In such a continuation equilibrium:
• By Property (P.2), the aggregate profit cannot exceed that achieved in the candidate
equilibrium.
•  obtains the same profit (namely,  ∗1 − ∗1) as in the candidate equilibrium;
• 2 gets at least its candidate equilibrium profit ∗2 ; if that were not the case, 2 could
profitably deviate by rejecting’s deviant offer and deal instead only with: denoting
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by 1 1’s output of good  in the continuation equilibrium, 2 would obtain in this
way:
max2
h

³
∗1 + 2 1
´
− 
i
2 ≥ max2 [ (
∗1 + 2 ∗1)− ] 2 = ∗2 
where the inequality follows from (P.3) and the fact that 2’s profit decreases in 1.
Thus, the deviation cannot be profitable for  −1.
Remark 3 Applying this reasoning to a deviant offer equal to the equilibrium shadow offer³
ˆ ˆ
´
shows that, in equilibrium,  −1 strictly prefers that 2 rejects ’s offer.
Remark 4 The previous remark does not necessarily imply that offering
³
ˆ ˆ
´
is a dominated
strategy for  − 1: this will indeed not be the case if there exists a 1 (together with an
appropriate best response 1) and a 2 such that  − 1 is better off when 2 mistakenly
accepts
³
ˆ ˆ
´
.
Suppose now that, in the continuation equilibrium, 1 rejects ’s offer.
Such a deviation yields quantities 1 = ˜1 (0 ¯)  1 = 0 2 = ¯ 2 = ˜2 (0 ¯)), where
(˜1 ˜2) denote the equilibrium outputs of the game Γ1−1 for ˆ1 = 0 and ˆ2 = ¯.
We first show that the continuation equilibrium, following ’s deviation (the “deviation
equilibrium,” referred to below with a superscript ), is less profitable for  − 1 than the
equilibrium of the game Γ1−1 for ˆ2 = ˆ1 = 0 (the “alternative equilibrium,” referred to below
with a superscript ). To see this, note that:
•  makes the same profit in both equilibrium scenarios:  =  = 0.
• 2 cannot make more profit in the alternative equilibrium than in the deviation equilib-
rium, i.e.: 2 ≤ 2 . To show this, consider a deviation from the “deviation equilibrium,”
in which 2 only accepts ’s offer; this deviation gives 2 a profit
2 ≡ max2 [ (2 
1)− ] 2
which (weakly) exceeds
2 = max2
h

³
2 1
´
− 
i
2
as 1 = ˜1 (0 0) ≥ 1 = ˜1 (0 ¯), from Property (P.3). As the “deviation from the
deviation equilibrium” has to be unprofitable, we have: 2 ≥ 2 ≥ 2 .
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• Property (P.2) ensures that the aggregate profit is larger in the alternative equilibrium
than in the deviation equilibrium:  + −1 + 2 ≥  + −1 + 2 .
It follows that the integrated firm makes more profit in the alternative equilibrium than in
the deviation equilibrium:
−1 ≥ −1 
But −1  ˜−1 = max1 [ (1 ∗2)− ] 1, as 2 is more aggressive in the alter-
native equilibrium than in the “pseudo duopoly” scenario in which 1 carries  only and 2
carries  only, but 2 anticipates that 1 is also carrying , and thus sells ∗2 = ˜2 (∗1 0)
rather than 2 = ˜2 (0 0). As ˜−1 = ∗−1 , we have:
−1 ≤ −1 ≤ ∗−1 
That is,  −1’s deviation is not profitable.
Finally, consider now a deviation by  − 1 that induces 2 to drop ’s offer.
Let
¡2 = ¯  0 2 = ¯¢ denote the deviant offer. As 2 can costlessly accept ’s offer to
supply at cost, and then choose 2 = 0, the above reasoning (for deviations inducing 2 to
accept the deviant offer by  as well as ’s offer) still applies, which concludes the proof.
L Proof of Proposition 11
To show existence of the equilibrium, let
Π( ) ≡ [ ()− ] + [ ( )− ]
denote aggregate output when 1 + 2 =  and 1 + 2 = . To support the vector
(∗∗1 ∗∗2 ∗∗1 ∗∗2) = (∗∗ 0 0 ∗∗) as an equilibrium outcome, we suppose that the two inte-
grated firms do not offer contracts to each other, i.e., ∗∗2 = ∅ and ∗∗1 = ∅. To show that
there is no profitable deviation, suppose that the integrated  − deviates from this candi-
date equilibrium by offering a contract e  () that induces a quantity ˆ through the channel
−. By assumption, does not offer any contract to  in the candidate equilibrium, and
thus we still have ˆ = 0, as in the candidate equilibrium. The resulting quantities ˜(ˆ 0)
and ˜(ˆ 0) are the equilibrium quantities in game Γ2−1 when ˆ = 0:
˜(ˆ 0) = argmax Π ( ˜(ˆ 0); ˆ 0)  (32)
˜(ˆ 0) = argmax Π (˜(ˆ 0) ; ˆ 0)  (33)
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Now, note that each integrated firm  − can guarantee itself at least the candidate equilib-
rium profit Π∗∗2 ≡ Π(∗∗ ∗∗)2 by simply rejecting ’s deviant offer; in this way, it would
obtain:
max Π (˜(ˆ 0) ; 0 0) 
But (P.3) implies ˜(ˆ 0) ≤ ˜(0 0) = ∗∗ ; as the profit of− decreases in , the above
profit is at least equal to:
max Π (
∗∗  ; 0 0) = Π∗∗2
Therefore, in order to be profitable, the deviation must increase the total profits of the two
integrated firms:
Π(˜(ˆ 0) + ˆ ˜(ˆ 0))  Π(∗∗∗∗)
But this contradicts (P.2).
To show uniqueness of equilibrium, suppose instead that there exists another equilibrium
(∗∗1 ∗∗2 ∗∗1 ∗∗2) 6= (∗∗ 0 0 ∗∗). This implies, in particular, that ∗∗2  0 or ∗∗1  0. The
induced aggregate profit is Π(∗∗  ∗∗ ), where ∗∗ ≡ ∗∗1 + ∗∗2 and ∗∗ ≡ ∗∗1 + ∗∗2. By
(P.2), we have Π(∗∗  ∗∗ )  Π (∗∗ ∗∗). The equilibrium profit of at least one of the two
integrated firms, say  − 1, must therefore be strictly less than Π (∗∗ ∗∗) 2. Consider
the following deviation by  − 1: it does not offer any contract to the rival retailer 2 nor
does it accept any contract from the rival manufacturer . The deviation at the offer stage
induces a continuation equilibrium in which 2 expects 1 to put some quantity 1 of good
 on the market, and therefore chooses a quantity ˜2(1 0) ≥ 0. Property (P.3) then implies
˜2(1 0) ≤ ˜2(0 0) = ∗∗. As  −1’s deviation profit decreases with 2, it is bounded
from below by Π (∗∗ ∗∗) 2, a contradiction.
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